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Abstract—The Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification by
the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance defines the requirements
which Ethereum Clients offering private smart contract capa-
bilities should comply with. This specification though ground
breaking, misses some important blockchain requirements and
does not fully consider the requirements of Ethereum Clients
offering Private Sidechain capabilities. This paper presents the
case for Private Sidechains and defines requirements to be
complied with to deliver this technology.
The capabilities of three blockchain clients have been
analysed based on the requirements: Quorum, Parity, and
Hyperledger Fabric. Quorum and Hyperledger Fabric operate
as private consortium blockchains where as Parity delivers
private transaction capabilities on top of Ethereum MainNet.
These differing approaches has led to different strengths and
weaknesses which has resulted in each client not complying
with one or more key requirement. In particular, none of the
reviewed blockchain clients support the ability to determine
bootstrap information to establish on-demand blockchains and
none of the clients support secure management and pinning
from Ethereum MainNet.
This paper presents Ethereum Private Sidechains and a
range of technologies which allow it to deliver on complex
sidechain requirements. Ethereum Registration Authorities are
presented, which allow entities which have not previously inter-
acted to securely obtain information to bootstrap a sidechain,
and a Management and Pinning strategy is described which
allows the state of a sidechain to be securely pinned to
Ethereum MainNet without compromising privacy.
1. Introduction
Ethereum [1] is a blockchain platform which allows for
the upload and execution of computer programs known as
“smart contracts”. In the Ethereum public network, “Main-
Net”, all contract code and data are readable by any user of
any node which connects to the network. Permissioning is
a feature of systems in which authorised users are authenti-
cated to use objects according to access control rules. In the
context of Ethereum, permissioning could be used to limit
which nodes connect to other nodes on the network, which
users can use a node’s JSON RPC API, and which Ethereum
Accounts can use a smart contract. Ethereum MainNet can
only perform permissioning in contract code, limiting which
accounts can update the state of a contract. However, there
is no mechanism to limit which users can read contract code
and data.
Enterprises need security and permissioning over and
above what is available in standard Ethereum [2]. This has
led to a range of platforms being developed to address the
need for “private smart contracts”. J.P. Morgan developed
Quorum [3], a fork of the Golang Ethereum implementation
called, geth [4]. Parity Technologies added a Private Trans-
actions feature to their existing Ethereum client. Hyper-
ledger Fabric [5] is a distributed ledger platform originally
created by IBM and now hosted by The Linux Foundation.
This platform directly competes with Quorum and Parity,
offering privacy and permissioning features. Whereas Quo-
rum and Parity offer private smart contracts which operate
on or in conjunction with a permissionless blockchain,
Hyperledger Fabric offers the ability to host one or more
smart contracts on a private blockchain called a “channel”.
Hyperledger Fabric allows multiple channels to be operated
on the one network, thus allowing for multiple sets of private
contracts between different sets of participants to operate on
the one network.
Quorum and Hyperledger Fabric are private blockchain
systems which are targeted at consortiums who wish to
operate their own private networks. Parity offers its private
contract feature on the public Ethereum MainNet. The paper
proposes a middle ground, in which private permissioned
blockchains can use the strong non-repudiation security
guarantees of Ethereum MainNet.
The Ethereum community has been investigating how
to scale the platform. Sharding [6] [7], a term borrowed
from multi-user online gaming to describe how users are
split across servers, and used by the database community
to describe how data is split across servers, has been used
in the Ethereum community to describe how the blockchain
could be split such that smart contracts could operate on a
partition of the permissionless public blockchain [8]. Simi-
larly, Plasma [9] offers the possibility of operating multiple
permissionless delegate public blockchains.
Inspired by the concepts of Ethereum scaling, the con-
cepts from Hyperledger Fabric of offering multiple per-
missioned channels, and of the privacy and permission-
ing features of Quorum, this paper proposes the concept
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of Ethereum Private Sidechains: permissioned Ethereum
blockchains which host private smart contracts. Ethereum
Private Sidechains offer permissioning such that only nodes
which belong to organisations which are a party the
sidechain have access to the sidechain transactions or state.
The Ethereum Sidechain Client APIs are permissioned such
that only authorised users can interact with them, and
only authorised Ethereum Accounts can be used to submit
transactions from them. The transactions and the state of
sidechains are authenticated-encrypted to ensure data confi-
dentiality.
A contribution this paper proposes the concept of
Ethereum Registration Authorities (ERAs). These smart
contracts allow Ethereum Private Sidechains to be estab-
lished on-demand, in a similar way to how a user of a web
browser can establish a secure connection to a web server
by simply entering in a URL such as https://example.com/.
These smart contracts host look-up tables between domain
names and other organisation based smart contracts. These
organisation based smart contracts allow organisations to
securely publish data, such as the mapping between domain
names, IP addresses, and cryptographic keys. By being
deployed on Ethereum MainNet, they are both public and
secure. By being operated by reputable companies which
undertake Know Your Customer [10] due diligence, and
by operating the contracts on Ethereum MainNet which
provides strong non-repudiation guarantees, users of ERAs
will be safe in the knowledge that the data provided in these
contracts can be trusted.
A contribution this paper proposes a strategy for secure
Management and Pinning, to allow the sidechain state to be
pinned to a management chain. It outlines inter-sidechain re-
quirements which will allow communications across chains.
This analysis is a snapshot in time. The implementa-
tions analysed are constantly releasing updates with new
features. The Enterprise Ethereum Alliance are likely to
release an updated edition of their specification. It should be
expected that the compliance of implementations with the
requirements shown here will change with time, and the
requirements that the implementations need to meet will
change. However, this paper provides a template for how
such analysis of future requirements and future software
versions can be undertaken.
The analysis undertaken in this paper has been done in
good faith. Source code, example code, and documentation
do not always stay in sync. Determination of conformance
to many of the requirements is subjective. Please contact the
author if you have questions or concerns about this paper.
Many terms are used inconsistently and at times unin-
tentionally misleadingly in the blockchain field. To address
this issue, terms used in this paper are listed in a glossary
in Appendix B. In particular, the term “public” is used in
Quorum to mean a permissionless blockchain. In Parity the
term “public” can mean Ethereum MainNet or it can mean a
permissionless consortium blockchain. As such, throughout
this document, a “public” blockchain is a permissionless
blockchain and a “private” blockchain, sidechain or smart
contract is a permissioned blockchain, sidechain or smart
contract.
1.1. Contributions
The contributions made by this paper are:
• Definition of additional private blockchain require-
ments not included in the Enterprise Ethereum Client
Specification 1.0. These requirements have identi-
fiers which are prefixed with BC.
• Definition of sidechain specific requirements. These
requirement have identifiers which are prefixed with
SC.
• Analysis of how Quorum, Parity, and Hyperledger
Fabric solutions meet the Enterprise Ethereum Client
Specification 1.0 requirements and the requirements
laid out in this paper.
• Presentation of a blockchain architecture and Enter-
prise Ethereum Client architecture which meets the
needs of Ethereum Private Sidechain systems.
• Description of the Ethereum Registration Authority
system which allows for information to securely
placed onto the Ethereum blockchain such that it
is discoverable.
• Description of the Management and Pinning contract
which pins the state of a sidechain to Ethereum
MainNet without revealing the identities of sidechain
participants and whilst protecting the transaction rate
of the sidechain.
1.2. Organisation of Paper
This paper starts by defining the requirements for
Ethereum Private Sidechains. An example is presented to al-
low readers to more readily understand how sidechains could
work. The Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification v1.0
[2] is used as a basis for requirements. The requirements
relating to blockchains in general that were missed during
the development of the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specifi-
cation are laid out. This is followed by the sidechain specific
requirements. Quorum, Parity, and Hyperledger Fabric are
then analysed based on the requirements. Doing this com-
parison helps draw out where existing solutions are deficient,
and what needs to be done to deliver a better solution. A
proposed architecture for Ethereum Private Sidechains is
then presented.
2. Requirements
The Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification 1.0 [2]
defines the requirements for Ethereum Clients which offer
permissioning features. This specification has been written
based on Ethereum clients which are in existence in early
2018, and attempted to be forward looking. The specification
has missed some requirements which pertain to all Enter-
prise Ethereum clients. Additionally, there are sidechain spe-
cific requirements which are not captured. To understand the
requirements of Ethereum Private Sidechains, an example
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Figure 1. Usage Part 1
Figure 2. Usage Part 2
will be presented. Based on this example, the requirements
over and above those set-out in the Enterprise Ethereum
Client Specification for a client supporting Ethereum Private
Sidechains are presented.
To help understand the base-line requirements of the En-
terprise Ethereum Client Specification 1.0, the requirements
from the specification are included in Appendix A.
2.1. Example Use Case
Figures 1 to 4 show an example usage of Ethereum
Private Sidechains in which a house is purchased and then
a land registry is updated based on the house purchase.
Configuration and management of the sidechain is handled
on Ethereum MainNet. Sidechain 1 holds an Oracle [2]
contract from which data needs to be read. Sidechain 2 holds
a land registry contract, which needs to be updated once the
house purchase has been finalised.
To complete the transaction data needs to be read from
one sidechain and written to another sidechain. Walking
through the example in detail:
Figure 3. Usage Part 3
Figure 4. Usage Part 4
1) Participant A fetches configuration information
from a Configuration entity. This information con-
sists of addresses and keys and other information
required to establish the sidechain (Figure 1).
2) Participant A submits a transaction to register the
sidechain with a Management and Pinning contract
(Figure 1).
3) Participant A creates the sidechain, inviting other
entities to become participants of the sidechain
(Figure 1).
4) Participant A submits a transaction which creates
the House Purchase contract (Figure 2).
5) Participant A submits a transaction, which results
in fetching information from the Exchange Rate
Oracle contract on Sidechain 1 (Figure 2).
6) Participant B Fetches information from the House
Purchase contract (Figure 2).
7) Participant C submits a transaction to the House
Purchase contract (Figure 2).
8) Participant C submits a transaction in the House
Purchase contract which causes a transaction to be
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submitted which updates the Land Registry contract
(Figure 2).
9) Participant Q could be a special node which only
sees the encrypted state of Sidechain 3. It could
read the state of the sidechain and post a rep-
resentation of the state, known as a Pin, to the
Management and Pinning contract. This pinning of
the state could occur for each block or at regular
intervals such as after every 10 blocks, or could be
triggered to occur on demand (Figure 3).
10) A new node can be added to the sidechain, gaining
access to the House Purchase contract. The addition
needs to be agreed upon using some technique. One
technique could involve voting using the Manage-
ment and Pinning contract (Figure 4).
2.2. Additional Blockchain Requirements
Derived from the example above, this paper proposes
additional blockchain requirements over and above those
listed in the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification.
2.2.1. Permissioning and Credentials. The Enterprise
Ethereum Client Specification lists requirements related to
authenticated participants that can execute JSON RPC API
calls. The requirements do not differentiate between the dif-
ferent types of calls. For example, submitting transactions,
performing read-only View calls [11], or calling administra-
tive APIs are all deemed the same. A user who is authenti-
cated to use the API can execute any of the APIs. It could be
imagined that in many cases having a node as a “read-only”
replica of the blockchain, from which applications could
only read data but not execute transactions could improve
security.
Additionally, there are no restrictions on which
Ethereum accounts can be used to issue transactions from
on a particular node. For example, if participant A in the
example submitted transactions from a certain Ethereum
Account A1, and participant B submitted transactions form
an Account B1, it would be a security issue if an attacker,
who has stolen participant A’s private key could submit
transactions from participant B’s nodes. Adding controls to
limit which Ethereum Accounts can be used with which
node will improve the security of Enterprise Ethereum
Clients.
Another situation which the Enterprise Ethereum Client
Specification does not address is that different types of
transactions should be treated differently. That is, an account
which can submit a transaction to update the state of a con-
tract should not necessarily be able to submit a transaction
which deploys a new contract.
The requirements below specify the needs described in
the paragraphs above:
• BC-1a-ApiCallPermissioning: Implementations
SHOULD provide separate access control
permissions for API calls which are Administrative,
API calls which allow viewing the state of the
distributed ledger or are View calls, API calls which
result in a transaction, API calls which result in
deploying a contract, and API calls which transfer
Ether.
• BC-1b-EthereumAccountWhitelist: Implementations
SHOULD allow for the specification of a whitelist
of Ethereum Accounts which can be used to send
transactions via the API.
• BC1c-TransactionTypePermissioning: Implementa-
tions SHOULD be able to authorise the types of
transactions an Ethereum Account can submit. That
is, separate permissioning should be provided for the
ability to deploy a contract, call a function which
changes the state of a contract, or performs a simple
value transfer.
The Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification’s require-
ment EE-6.1.2b-RestrictedPayloadMaskingStored and EE-
6.1.2k-UnrestrictedPayloadMaskingStored relate to storing
private transaction payloads securely. When these trans-
actions are executed, they update the private state of the
distribute ledger. Enterprise Ethereum Clients are likely to
store the private state persistently, to reduce the restart time
of a node. If the private state isn’t stored, then all private
transactions would need to be reprocessed each time an
Enterprise Ethereum node restarted. As such, the follow
requirement related to encryption of Enterprise Ethereum
client’s private state should be added to the Enterprise
Ethereum Client Specification.
• BC-1d-PrivateStateAuthenticatedEncryption: If an
implementation stores the private blockchain state
persistently it MUST protect the data using an
Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
(AEAD) algorithm such as one described in
RFC5116, “An Interface and Algorithms for Authen-
ticated Encryption” [12].
2.2.2. Organisations. The Private Smart Contracts are
likely to be between organisations. That is, in the example
entities A, B, C, D, and Q may represent separate organisa-
tions. For reasons of systems resilience, organisations will
want to operate at least four nodes. It can be envisaged
that each organisation would operate nodes in at least two
data centres. In this way, if one data centre becomes uncon-
tactable due to network outages or power failure, the other
data centre will continue to operate. Within each data centre,
it can be envisaged that the organisation would have nodes
in at least two racks of computers. In this way, if the power
or network connectivity to one rack of computers fails, the
data centre will still have an operational node. Computers
which are connected to the nodes in the data centre will still
be able to operate in a low latency environment, as they will
still be able to contact a node inside the data centre.
Organisations will host nodes on computers that will
need to go offline and come online from time to time
for reasons such as operating system updates and other
software updates. Additionally, the organisation may decide
to operate in a new data centre. In these situations, an
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Organisation needs to have a mechanism for adding and
removing nodes to and from a Private Sidechain.
Some companies with many resources may operate
dozens of nodes whereas a more resource constrained com-
pany with fewer resources may only operate a few nodes. All
Ethereum Private Sidechain protocols need to be designed to
be organisationally aware, and not give one company more
power because it has more nodes that another company.
Enterprise Ethereum networks generally, and Ethereum
Private Sidechains in particular, are established between
organisations who operate nodes. As such, it makes sense
when establishing an Ethereum Private Sidechain to not de-
note the network to be set-up by Ethereum enode addresses
of individual nodes, but by a higher level indication of the
organisations involved. For example, domain names repre-
senting organisations could be used. Using human under-
standable notation such as domain names also allows for the
possibility of establishing sidechains between organisations
without prior arrangement. It allows the sidechains to be
set-up without the need to exchange enode addresses and
other configuration information.
The Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification [2] in-
cludes requirement EE-5.1.1g-Organization, which states,
“An Enterprise Ethereum client SHOULD provide mecha-
nisms to define clusters of nodes at the organisational level,
in the context of permissioning.” This requirement can be
viewed as covering the need to address nodes using notation
such as domain names, and providing the facility for an
organisation to add nodes under its control to a sidechain
as and when necessary. It however does not cover the need
for protocols to be organisationally aware.
• BC-2a-OrganisationallyAwareConsensus:
Implementations SHOULD use organisationally
aware consensus and voting algorithms.
2.2.3. Bootstrapping. Bootstrapping information needs to
be available in a discoverable format. Doing this would
allow sidechains to be created on-demand for previously un-
related parties. In the example, the configuration information
could be in a discoverable format to allow participant A to
find the enode address and encryption key information for
the other entities. This then allows participant A to estab-
lish a sidechain immediately with the desired participants.
This system of bootstrapping information for blockchain is
analogous to the Domain Name System (DNS), Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), and Transport Layer Security (TLS)
which combine to allow users of web browsers to enter
a URL, for example https://example.com/, and be
able to instantly, securely view information from a remote
web server. Not having such a system of bootstrapping in-
formation for blockchain means that adding new participants
to a network is a complex and time consuming process.
• BC-3a-DiscoverableBootstrapInfo: Implementations
SHOULD provide a mechanism to discover boot-
strap information for parties they have no previous
relationship.
2.2.4. Decentralisation. A core tenant of Ethereum is de-
centralisation [13]. Architectural decentralisation refers to
the property of a network in which there are no single points
of failure. Political decentralisation refers to the property
of a system where it is not controlled by a single or a
small number of entities. Logical Decentralisation is the
idea that a system may hold two values for the same item.
For example, in the English language, the word “Colour”
is spelt with a “u” in some countries and without a “u”
in others, whilst the meaning of the word remains the
same. In blockchain systems, Architectural and Political
Decentralisation is desirable, and Logical Decentralisation
is not allowed as systems need to come to a consensus on
the state of the distributed ledger.
These concepts of Architectural and Political Decentral-
isation correspond to goals of the internet laid out some
thirty years ago. Clark [14] when describing the design goals
for the Internet refers to, “Internet communication must
continue despite loss of networks or gateways”, as a primary
goal and, “The Internet architecture must permit distributed
management of its resources”, as one of the secondary goals.
The fact that Architectural and Political Decentralisation
were important when developing the internet provides a
good indication of their importance in the blockchain era.
The following requirements relate to decentralisation.
• BC-4a-ArchitecturalDecentralisation: Implementa-
tions SHOULD not have any points of architectural
centralisation.
• BC-4b-PoliticalDecentralisation: Implementations
SHOULD not have components which need to be
controlled by a single entity or a small number of
entities.
2.2.5. Off-chain Messaging. In the example, participant A
could have been a company which represented an individual
and participant B could have been a company which repre-
sents an individual. They may need to exchange the identity
verification data they have about the individuals either with
each other or they may need to distribute this information to
all entities on the sidechain. In some jurisdictions, storing
such sensitive information on a blockchain may not be
desirable. As such, there is a need for Enterprise Ethereum
solutions in general to offer off-chain communications ca-
pabilities. The off-chain communications method needs to
ensure all communications is private. The requirements be-
low reflect those needs.
• BC-5a-OffchainOrgToOrg: Implementations
SHOULD provide an off-chain messaging
mechanism which allows messages to be sent
from one node to the nodes belonging to one or
more organisations.
• BC-5b-OffchainAll: Implementations SHOULD
provide an off-chain messaging mechanism which
allows messages to be sent from one node to the
all nodes on the blockchain.
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• BC-5c-OffchianAntiSpam: Off-chain messaging
mechanisms, if implemented, MUST have anti-spam
features.
• BC-5d-Whisper: Implementations SHOULD imple-
ment Whisper.
2.2.6. Performance. The Enterprise Ethereum Client
Specification requirements related to performance are
not measurable and as such are not able to be met.
Requirements EE-6.2.3b-ComputePowerSizeParticipants
and EE-6.2.3c-RecentBlockAccessTime allow for infinitely
large blockchain size by specifying, “regardless
of the blockchain size”. Requirement EE-6.2.3b-
ComputePowerSizeParticipants allows for an infinitely
large number of participants by stating, “regardless of the...
number of network participants”. These requirements need
to be replaced with requirements which can be measured,
are achievable, and meet customer expectations. The
specification of such requirements is beyond the scope of
this paper and is listed in the Future Work section.
2.3. Additional Sidechain Requirements
Derived from the example above, this paper proposes
requirements for sidechains over and above those listed in
the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification.
2.3.1. Permissioning and Credentials. Ethereum Private
Sidechain implementations need to implement permission-
ing to restrict sidechain creation. In the example, participant
A requested a node create a sidechain. Nodes under partic-
ipant B, C, D, and Q’s control accepted requests to join the
sidechain. Permissioning also must be implemented to limit
access between sidechains. In the example, Sidechain 3 was
able to perform a read-only View call [11] from Sidechain
1 and perform a transaction on Sidechain 2.
It has been assumed that requirements EE-
5.1.1cWhitelistNodes to EE-5.1.1f-BlacklistViaAPI apply
on a per sidechain basis for Ethereum Private Sidechains.
Thus the additional requirements required are as shown
below.
• SC-1a-EstablishmentNodesWhitelist: It MUST be
possible to specify a whitelist of node or organi-
sation identities that are permitted to send sidechain
establishment requests.
• SC-1b-EstablishmentNodesBlacklist: Implementa-
tions MAY allow a blacklist of node or organisation
identities to be specified that are not permitted to
send sidechain establishment requests.
Only certain participant identities should be able to
establish a sidechain. The requirements below reflect this
need.
• SC-2a-EstablishmentApiWhitelist: Implementations
MUST provide the ability to specify a white list of
participant identities who are permitted to establish
a sidechain.
• SC-2b-EstablishmentApiBlacklist: Implementations
MAY provide the ability to specify a black list
of participant identities who are not permitted to
establish a sidechain.
2.3.2. Client Interfaces Sublayer. It is anticipated that
most existing JSON-RPC API calls should have an addi-
tional parameter to indicate which sidechain they pertain to.
Additional APIs need to be created which allow sidechains
to be created on demand based on a list of domain names. As
such the API requirements for sidechains are shown below.
• SC-3a-SidechainFindOrEstablishmentApi:
Implementations MUST have an API which
takes a set of domain names, organisational
identifiers or node enode addresses, and requests
the node find an existing sidechain, or create a new
sidechain if no such existing sidechain exists. The
function returns a sidechain identifier.
• SC-3b-SidechainIdentifier: Implementations MUST
allow an optional “sidechain identifier” parameter to
be specified for existing API calls. In the case of the
eth sendTransactionAsync function, an alternative
function which takes a sidechain instead of a set
of recipient public keys MUST be implemented.
Further analysis is needed to determine the specific
administration APIs needed for adding and removing par-
ticipants of a sidechain.
2.3.3. Inter-Chain. EE-5.3.2a-InterChainInteraction [2]
states, “Enterprise Ethereum implementations MAY provide
inter-chain mediation capabilities to enable interaction with
different blockchains.” This requirement relates to commu-
nication between blockchain platforms, such as between
Quorum and Hyperledger Fabric, or between two instances
of the same platform, or between two sidechains within
the same instance of a platform. The word “interaction”
allows for many types of communications, including pin-
ning the state of a sidechain or blockchain. More specific
requirements are needed describe precisely what should be
implemented to provide sidechain pinning capabilities.
As per the example, the state of Sidechain 3 needs to
be able to be pinned to the management chain, MainNet.
The pinning needs to be done in such as way that the list of
participants on Sidechain 3 is not revealed on the MainNet
as part of the pinning process. The rate of transactions need
to be masked such that participants on MainNet can not
infer the activity level on the sidechain. The frequency of
pinning needs to be configurable. That is, pinning could be
done for each block, or after a certain number of blocks, or
at certain time intervals.
The pins of the sidechain state, once posted to MainNet
must be able to be contested by members of the sidechain.
It could be expected that the act of contesting a pin may
require revealing of the identity on MainNet.
It may be possible for special participants of the
sidechain to only see cipher text. These parties could post
pins of the encrypted state to MainNet, but not know the
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plaintext that the are providing the attestation for. Doing this
means that sidechain participants who can see the plaintext
of a channel do not have to reveal themselves on MainNet
by the act of pinning. Participant Q in the example could
be such a participant.
The requirements below address these needs.
• SC-4a-Pinning: The state of the sidechain MUST
be able to be pinned to a management chain or
Ethereum MainNet.
• SC-4b-PinningParticipantShielding: The list of par-
ticipants of a sidechain SHOULD be able to be
shielded when pins are posted to the management
chain or Ethereum MainNet.
• SC-4c-PinningTransactionRateShielding: The trans-
action rate of a sidechain SHOULD be able to be
shielded when pins are posted to a management
chain or Ethereum MainNet.
• SC-4d-PinningContesting: Implementations MUST
provide a mechanism for sidechain participants to
contest a pin posted to the management chain. The
act of contesting a pin may require the sidechain
participant to reveal themselves.
• SC-4e-PinningCipherTextObservers: Implemen-
tations MAY provide a mechanism such that
special nodes that can observe the cipher text
transactions on the sidechain, that do not have
access to the plaintext transactions, can post pins
of the sidechain state to the management chain or
Ethereum MainNet.
• SC-4f-PinningConfiguration: Implementations
SHOULD allow cross chain pinning frequency to
be configurable. That is, pinning could be done for
each block, or after a certain number of blocks, or
at certain time intervals.
For sidechain systems to be effective, Ethereum clients
which support sidechains need to allow a multitude of
sidechains to operate simultaneously. In the example there
were three sidechain in addition to the management chain.
Ethereum Private Sidechain clients need to have a specific
requirement to support multiple clients.
• SC-4g-MultipleSidechains: Implementations MUST
be able to operate multiple sidechains simultane-
ously.
2.3.4. Privacy Sublayer. Requirement EE-6.1.2r-
PrivateTransactionAddParticipants states, “Implementations
SHOULD be able to extend the set of participants in a
private transaction (or forward the private transaction in
some way).” In the context of Ethereum Private Sidechains,
adding a participant to a private transaction means adding an
organisation and its nodes to a sidechain, or an organisation
adding a node to a sidechain.
2.3.5. Storage and Ledger Sublayer. Requirement EE-
7.1c-SeparateStoragePerNetwork states, “Implementations
providing support for multiple networks (for example, one
or more consortium networks or a public network) MUST
store data related to private transactions for those networks
in private state dedicated to the relevant network.” In the
context of Ethereum Private Sidechains, this requirement
should be interpreted to mean that the state of each sidechain
should be encrypted with different keys and stored logically
separately.
Requirement EE-7.1d-DataAccessSameParticipants [2],
“A smart contract operating on private state SHOULD be
permitted to access private state created by other smart
contracts involving the same participants.” can be interpreted
as meaning smart contracts on a sidechain can access other
smart contracts on the same sidechain. Requirement EE-
7.1e-DataAccessDifferentParticipants, “A smart contract op-
erating on private state MUST NOT be permitted to access
private state created by other smart contracts involving
different participants.” relates to a smart contract on one
sidechain accessing a smart contract on another sidechain.
In the example, the Exchange Rate Oracle Contract on
Sidechain 1 could be operated by a company which provided
access to the data of the Oracle for a fee. The partici-
pants who could submit transactions to update the state
of the sidechain could be restricted to the operators of
the sidechain. Any entity prepared to pay for access could
become a participant which could read from the sidechain.
As such, the participants of Sidechain 2 will be different to
the participants of Sidechain 3. Additionally, in the example,
Sidechain 2 would be operated by a government department
tasked with operating the land registry. They might allow
certain parties under certain circumstances to submit trans-
actions to the land registry contract. The parties involved in
such a contract will be different from the participants of the
House Purchase Contract on sidechain 3. As such, to sup-
port Ethereum Private Sidechains, the requirement EE-7.1e-
DataAccessDifferentParticipants should be removed and in
their place there should be the following requirements.
• SC-5a-DataAccessDifferentParticipants: “A smart
contract operating on private state SHOULD be per-
mitted to access private state created by other smart
contracts which at involve an overlapping participant
list, where the accessed private state resides on a
chain which is configured to allow such access.”
2.3.6. Synchronisation and Disaster Recovery. In the ex-
ample, after some period of time, the details of the House
Purchase Contract and the entire contents of the sidechain
may become irrelevant. To reduce costs of maintaining the
data, the sidechain may need to be archived. The require-
ment below addresses this need.
• SC-6a-SidechainArchive: Implementations MAY
provide the ability to archive a sidechain.
3. Existing Privacy Solutions
3.1. Introduction
The sections below analyse how existing distributed
ledger privacy solutions meet the Enterprise Ethereum
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Client Specification requirements and the Ethereum Pri-
vate Sidechain requirements described in this document.
Two Ethereum based privacy technologies are analysed:
J.P. Morgan’s Quorum [3] and Parity Technologies’ Private
Transactions [15]. Additionally, a non-Ethereum technology,
Hyperledger Fabric [16] [5] is analysed. Analysing Hyper-
ledger Fabric against these requirements is important as it
presents itself as a good solution for consortium networks.
Summary information of the analysis is presented in
Tables 2 to 7 which are at the end of this paper. Section
6.1.4 of the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification de-
scribes three Privacy Levels. Table 2 shows the Enterprise
Ethereum Privacy Level C requirements. To be compliant
with this level, all of the requirements in the Enterprise
Ethereum Client Specification indicated as MUST or MUST
NOT must be complied with; with the exception that im-
plementations need to be compliant with only either the
restricted private transactions or the unrestricted private
transactions from section 6.1.2. Table 3 shows the En-
terprise Ethereum Privacy Level B requirements. To be
compliant with this level, in addition to the requirements
for Privacy Level C, the implementation must be compli-
ant with all of the requirements in sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2,
and 5.1.3 marked as SHOULD in the Enterprise Ethereum
Client Specification. Table 4 shows the Enterprise Ethereum
Privacy Level A requirements. To be compliant with this
level, in addition to complying with the requirements of
Privacy Level B, the implementation must comply with all
of the requirements indicated as SHOULD in section 6.1.2
of the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification. Table 5
shows all other requirements described in the Enterprise
Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification. Table 6 and 7
present novel requirements in addition to the Enterprise
Ethereum Client Specification requirements. Table 6 shows
the additional requirements which pertain to all Enterprise
Ethereum blockchain clients. Ethereum Private Sidechain
specific requirements are described in Table 7.
In the tables, requirements which are complied with
are indicated by X. Table cells containing a × indicates
a requirement denoted as MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD,
or SHOULD NOT that is not complied with. Requirements
which are denoted as MAY which are not implemented or
not complied with are indicated in the tables with a dash
(-).
In the tables, Ethereum specific requirements
that Hyperledger Fabric does not meet as it is
not an Ethereum based platform are marked as
“Ethereum”. Ethereum specific requirements relate to
forming consensus with Ethereum MainNet, using
Ethereum JSON RPC APIs, or implementing specific
Ethereum protocols such as DEVp2p and Whisper.
The requirements which are deemed to be Ethereum
specific are: EE-4.1a-DApp, EE-5.3.1a-JsonRpcPublicEth,
EE-5.3.1b-JsonRpcTransactionAsyncExt, EE-
5.3.1c-JsonRpcUnimplemented, EE-6.1.2h-
RestrictedDefaultSecure, EE-7.1a-StoragePubEth, EE-7.2a-
EvmOpCodes, EE-7.2b-EvmExtendedOpCodes, EE-7.2c-
PublicStateSync, EE-7.2d-PrecompiledContracts, EE-7.3a-
MainNetConsensus, EE-8.1b-DevP2P, EE-8.1c-Eth62Eth63,
EE-8.1d-NewProtocols, EE-10a-PublicEthCompatibility,
EE-10b-ExtendedApisSuperset, and BC-5d-Whisper. For
requirements where analogies can be made between
platforms, then these are deemed valid requirements.
3.2. Quorum
3.2.1. Introduction. JP Morgan created Quorum [3], a fork
of geth [4] which provides Private Smart Contracts for
Ethereum based consortium networks. Quorum operates a
blockchain which communicates “public” transactions and
special “private” transactions which just contain the mes-
sage digest of the private transaction payload. Encrypted
payloads are communicated between nodes using a private
transaction manager component called “Constellation”. In
addition to communicating transactions only to a specified
set of nodes, Constellation is responsible for storage of the
encrypted transactions for a node. The “public” blockchain
is similar to a typical Ethereum instance. It is referred to as
“public” as it is not permissioned, whereas the private state
is permissioned. Both the public state and private state are
stored in Quorum’s database unencrypted.
To set-up a Quorum network, the enode addresses for
each node are shared out of band with all nodes. Enode
addresses combine an Ethereum address, an IP address, and
UDP and TCP port for devP2P discovery and operational
communications. To add or remove a node to the Quorum
network, enode addresses must be supplied to all nodes.
Public transactions to the public blockchain are sub-
mitted using standard Ethereum JSON RPC calls. Private
transactions must be submitted using the API similar but
incompatible with the one described in EE-5.3.1b-JsonRpc2.
The recipients of the private transaction are specified using
the public encryption key of the destination nodes.
Processing of private transactions is as follows [17]:
Quorum determines that the transaction is private by detect-
ing the “privateFor” field in the JSON RPC call and passes
the transaction to Constellation. The transaction payload is
encrypted using a randomly generated symmetric key. The
message digest of the cipher text is kept as a digest of the
encrypted transaction. The symmetric key of the encrypted
transaction is encrypted against the public encryption keys
for each recipient node specified in the “privateFor” field.
The encrypted transaction along with encrypted symmetric
key and digest of the encrypted transaction are sent to each
node participating in the transaction. The recipient node
stores the encrypted symmetric key and encrypted transac-
tion in a map using the digest of the encrypted transaction
as the key. Once the encrypted payload has been sent to
each Constellation node, a special public transaction which
is marked as holding a private transaction payload digest
is submitted to the public blockchain. The transaction is
marked as being private by having a “private” flag in the
Ethereum transaction “V” field. When the public transaction
becomes part of a finalised block, each node checks its
private transaction map, using the digest of the encrypted
transaction as they key. If an encrypted transaction is found,
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then the transaction is decrypted and processed using the
private state Ethereum Virtual Machine.
Quorum offers the ability for Private Smart Contracts
stored in the private state to call functions on Smart Con-
tracts in the public state. The Private Smart Contracts can
not alter the state of a Smart Contract stored in the public
state, and as such should only be called on “View” functions.
The following sections analyse how Quorum meets
the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification requirements,
the additional blockchain requirements, and the additional
Sidechain requirements. The analysis has been based on
Quorum’s documentation [17], its examples [18], source
code [3], and conversations with people who have used
Quorum in Proof of Concept deployments.
3.2.2. Application Layer. As Quorum extends the capabili-
ties of geth, it allows users to make use of many of the tools
which have been and continue to be created for use with
geth. This means that many requirements are conformed
with by virtue of Quorum extending geth. The paragraphs
below analyse the Application Layer requirements.
EE-4.1a-DApp: Quorum does not support the JSON-
RPC API Enterprise Ethereum extension described in EE-
5.3.1b-JsonRpcTransactionAsyncExt, and as such does not
comply with this requirement.
EE-4.3a-Tools: As Quorum extends geth, it is able to
leverage the standard Ethereum smart contract deployment
and debugging tools for use with its Enterprise Ethereum
smart contracts. Quorum is compliant with this requirement.
EE-4.3b- FormalVerification: Any formal verification
methods which become available for use with standard
Ethereum are likely to work with Enterprise Ethereum
contracts in Quorum. As such, Quorum should be deemed
compliant with this requirement.
3.2.3. Tooling Layer. Quorum offers node permissioning
but does not provide any authentication or access control
of participants using its API. As such, where as many
of the node based requirements are supported, most of
the participant based requirements are not supported. The
paragraphs below analyse each requirement.
EE-5.1.1a-StaticStartUp: Nodes which are a party to a
Quorum network are specified in a file which needs to be
securely shared with all participants out of band. As such,
Quorum complies with the requirement to specify at startup
a list of static peer nodes.
EE-5.1.1b-DisableDiscovery: Quorum does not allow for
discovery of nodes in its Constellation network. As such,
Quorum is not compliant with the requirement to be able to
enable or disable peer-to-peer node discovery.
EE-5.1.1c-WhitelistNodes: Nodes which are to connect
to the Quorum network must be explicitly enabled in a
configuration file. As such, Quorum complies with the re-
quirement to provide the ability to specify a whitelist of the
node identities permitted to join the network.
EE-5.1.1d-BlacklistNodes: Quorum does not support
blacklisting of nodes.
EE-5.1.1e-WhitelistViaAPI: Quorum does not provide
the ability to programmatically update the list of whitelisted
nodes. As such, Quorum does not comply with this require-
ment.
EE-5.1.1f-BlacklistViaAPI: This requirement is condi-
tional on the blacklisting support from requirement EE-
5.1.1d-BlacklistNodes. As such, this requirement is not ap-
plicable.
EE-5.1.1g-CertifyNodes: Nodes are identified by enode
addresses. These addresses are shared out of band between
all participants. There is no certification process as such for
these identifiers. As such, Quorum does not comply with
this requirement.
EE-5.1.1h-Organization: Quorum does not support a
grouping or clustering of nodes for permissioning purposes.
As such, Quorum does not comply with this requirement.
Quorum does not provide any mechanism to authenticate
users of the JSON RPC API. As such, there is no ability
to whitelist or blacklist participant identities who are
permitted to submit transactions or use any other API.
Quorum does not comply with requirements EE-5.1.2a-
WhitelistParticipants, EE-5.1.2b-BlacklistParticipants,
EE-5.1.2c-WhitelistParticipantsViaAPI, EE-5.1.2e-
CertifyParticipants, and EE-5.1.2f-GroupsRoles. The
requirement EE-5.1.2d-BlacklistParticipantsViaAPI is
conditional on the blacklisting support from requirement
EE-5.1.2b-BlacklistParticipants. As such, this requirement
is not applicable.
EE-5.1.3a-SmartContractPermissioning: Quorum allows
contracts written in any Ethereum Virtual Machine language.
This allows application developers to write their contracts
such that they use address based permissioning in their
smart contracts. This allows Quorum to comply with this
requirement.
EE-5.1.3b-RuntimeConfigUpdate: Quorum allows the
configuration to be updated such that new nodes are added
to Quorum networks. The configuration can also be updated
to remove nodes, however these nodes will not be removed
unless the network connection between nodes is disrupted
or the node restarts. As such, Quorum partially complies
with this requirement.
EE-5.1.3c-ConfigOptions: Quorum provides configura-
tion via flat files. As such, Quorum complies with this
requirement.
EE-5.1.3d-LocalKeyManagement: Quorum offers a sim-
plistic key management approach in which key pairs are
generated during an initialisation step and then stored in
a file. No key roll-over or revocation is possible. Despite
the Quorum’s key management approach limitations, it does
comply with this requirement as it does support local key
management to allow users to secure their private keys.
EE-5.1.3e-SecureExternalKeyGenStore: Quorum does
not support external key generation or key storage, and as
such does not comply with this requirement.
EE-5.1.3f-HardwareSecurityModules: Quorum does not
support Hardware Security Modules and as such does not
comply with this requirement.
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EE-5.2.1a-IntegrationLibraries: There are a variety of
integration libraries available for interacting with Quorum.
For example, web3j supports Java integration with Quorum
[19].
Quorum does not support enterprise software deploy-
ment and configuration systems, software fault reporting
capabilities, performance management capabilities, security
management interaction capabilities, historical analysis, or
enterprise management systems. However, products such as
Kaleido [20] which provide Quorum as a managed service,
allow users of Quorum to have enterprise capabilities. As
such, requirements EE-5.2.2a-EntDeployment, EE-5.2.2b-
EntFaultReporting, EE-5.2.2c-EntPerformanceManage, EE-
5.2.2d-EntSecurity, and EE-5.2.2e-EntHistoricalAnalysis are
marked as compliant when Quorum is used in conjunction
with Kaleido.
EE-5.3.1a-JsonRpcPublicEth: Quorum complies with
this requirement as it supports the public Ethereum JSON-
RPC API. Quorum supports an eth sendTransactionAsync
API, but does not support the “restriction” parameter.
Given the “restriction” parameter is an optional parameter,
this requirement EE-5.3.1b-JsonRpcTransactionAsyncExt
is almost complied with, but not quite. EE-5.3.1c-
JsonRpcUnimplemented is also not complied with as it re-
lates to actions taken in regard to the “restriction” parameter.
EE-5.3.2a-InterChainInteraction: Quorum allows private
smart contracts to call functions on public smart contracts
which read from public state. This is not an inter-chain
interaction as there is only one blockchain upon which both
private and public smart contracts sit. As such, Quorum
does not offer any inter-chain mediation itself. However, so
called, “Layer 2” solutions, which use the Quorum platform,
but do not alter the protocol, could be used to offer some
cross-chain support. For example, a smart contract could be
written to act as an intermediary between another blockchain
and an instance of Quorum.
EE-5.3.3a-Oracles: Quorum could be configured to in-
teract with a real world oracle. For example, the Oracle
could be stored in a secure enclave, and sign transactions
from inside the secure enclave [21]. An Oracle could read
information from the blockchain.
3.2.4. Privacy and Scaling Layer. : The paragraphs below
analyse the privacy and scaling related requirements.
EE-6.1.1a-OnChainSecurity: Quorum is a fork of geth.
As such, as improved on-chain security techniques become
available in geth, they will become available in Quorum,
when the Quorum maintainers upgrade Quorum to the ver-
sion of geth which has the desired feature. For example,
Quorum users gained access to zkSnark support when Quo-
rum was updated to include the geth Byzantium release
which implements the ECC scalar multiplication, ECC point
addition, and pairing checks, precompiled contracts [22].
Quorum implements restricted private transactions
where the payload data is transmitted to and readable
only by the direct participants of a transaction, but not
unrestricted private transactions. As such, requirement
EE-6.1.2a-PrivTransMethods is complied with, and re-
quirements EE-6.1.2i-UnrestrictedRecipientMasking to EE-
6.1.2q-UnrestrictedTransactions are not applicable.
EE-6.1.2b-RestrictedPayloadMaskingStored: Constella-
tion stores private transactions in encrypted form. To ex-
ecute a private transaction, the private transaction payload
is passed to Quorum’s Golang code, which executes the
transaction in the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). The
updated state as a result of the transaction is stored in
plaintext in the Quorum node’s state database. As such,
Quorum complies with the requirement to“support mask-
ing or obfuscation of the payload data when stored in
restricted private transactions (for example, using crypto-
graphic encryption)”. It could be argued that this does
not meet then intention of the requirement and thus
would not match customer expectations. Requirement EE11-
1c-PrivateStateAuthenticatedEncryption (section 2.2.1) has
been added to specify that private state that is persisted must
be protected.
EE-6.1.2c-RestrictedPayloadMaskingTransit: Constella-
tion encrypts data when it is in transit. As such, Quorum
complies with this requirement.
Requirements EE-6.1.2d-
RestrictedMetadataMaskingStored and EE-6.1.2e-
RestrictedMetadataMaskingTransit relate to transaction
metadata. Transaction metadata is defined in the Enterprise
Ethereum Client Specification as, “The set of data that
describes and gives information about the payload data in
a transaction.” Transaction metadata which is stored on the
Quorum public state for private transaction are the account
which submitted the transaction (the “from” transaction
field), which contract is the target of the transaction (the
“to” field), and the number of transactions the account
has previously submitted (the “nonce” transaction field).
Quorum does not have capabilities to protect this metadata
which could relate to a private smart contract between one
set of participants from other participants who are on the
Quorum network. As such, Quorum complies with neither
of these requirements.
Quorum does not support relay nodes. As such
requirements EE-6.1.2f-RestrictedPayloadRelayStore and
EE-6.1.2g-RestrictedMetadataRelayStore are not applica-
ble. Quorum does not support the JSON RPC API
eth sendTransactionAsync call, and as such requirement
EE-6.1.2h-RestrictedDefaultSecure is not applicable.
EE-6.1.2r-PrivateTransactionAddParticipants: The En-
terprise Ethereum Client Specification [2] says that, “Im-
plementations SHOULD be able to extend the set of par-
ticipants in a private transaction (or forward the private
transaction in some way).” Private contracts in Quorum are
established by a participant submitting a private transaction
using an Ethereum account on a Quorum node, and having
that private transaction configured to be “privateFor” the
nodes which belong to the other parties which are to become
participants in the contract. Once the contract is deployed,
there is no facility to add participants to the contract. Private
transactions pertain to executing transactions on a private
smart contract. As such, there is no mechanism to extend
the set of participants for a private transaction in Quorum.
10
EE-6.1.2s-PrivateTransactionConsensus: Quorum’s pub-
lic blockchain uses consensus algorithms to achieve con-
sensus. There is however no consensus algorithm used for
participants of private transactions to achieve consensus.
Private transactions are sent individually to participants of a
private contract using Constellation. As such, Quorum does
not comply with this requirement. Having a shared state
between participants of a private contract is fundamental
to blockchain systems. As such, this requirement, though
specified as SHOULD, should be marked as MUST.
EE-6.1.3a-OffchainTrustedExecution: Quorum does not
support off-chain, trusted execution of transactions and
smart contracts. As such, Quorum does not comply with
this requirement.
EE-6.2.1a-ImprovedOnchainProcessing: Ethereum
Layer 2 scaling techniques are techniques which improve
the processing rate of Ethereum without requiring
changes to Ethereum’s underlying protocols. For example,
conceptually, Plasma [9] provides the possibility of
executing many parallel blockchains. The Ethereum Layer
2 solutions which become available would allow the
Quorum public chain to scale, which would mean that more
transactions include private transaction payload hashes
could be processed. This would allow a large Quorum
network to scale, assuming the participants involved in
the private transactions were not overlapping. That is,
Quorum could scale by having multiple parallel smart
contracts with non-overlapping participants. However, these
techniques would not facilitate the transaction rates for a
particular contract to scale. This requirement is complied
with because there is a way that Ethereum Layer 2 scaling
techniques can be used to scale Quorum’s transaction
processing capabilities.
EE-6.2.2a-OffchainProcessing: Quorum does not pro-
vide the ability for off-chain processing of transactions.
There is one Quorum public transaction with the message
digest of the private transaction’s payload for each private
transaction. Additionally, the smart contract function call
which is executed as a result of the private transaction
is executed in the same Quorum process as the public
transactions. As such, Quorum does not comply with this
requirement.
EE-6.2.3a-ArchivePrivateState: Quorum does not sup-
port any private state data archiving and as such does not
comply with this requirement.
EE-6.2.3d-NewGenesisBlock: The genesis block can
only be specified once in Quorum. As such, it is not possible
for network operators to designate a new genesis block to
keep the blockchain size from growing perpetually.
3.2.5. Core Blockchain Layer. The paragraphs below anal-
yse the core blockchain requirements.
EE-7.1a-StoragePubEth: Quorum is a fork of geth. As
such, Quorum has the same storage capability as geth, a
public Ethereum client. Quorum complies with this require-
ment.
EE-7.1b-StorageForOptionalOffchain: Quorum does not
implement off-chain operations and as such does not have
data storage for such operations.
EE-7.1c-SeparateStoragePerNetwork: Quorum supports
a single consortium network. The Quorum public chain and
private transactions are in fact the one network. As such,
this requirement does not apply. If, however, it was argued
that the Quorum public blockchain and private transactions
were separate networks for the purposes of this question,
then Quorum would not comply with this requirement as
Quorum stores public and private state in the same database.
EE-7.1d-DataAccessSameParticipants: Quorum deploys
private contracts by sending a private transaction to create
a contract to the nodes which should participate in the con-
tract. Participants are free to deploy private contracts which
call functions in any other private contract, irrespective of
whether the list of participants for the contracts is the same
or different. If the participant list of the called contract is
smaller than the calling contract, then when a transaction is
processed which contains a call from the calling contract to
the called contract, the transaction succeeds on nodes which
have both contracts and fails on nodes which only have the
calling contract. Given this analysis, Quorum complies with
requirement EE-7.1d-DataAccessSameParticipants, that a
“...smart contract operating on private state SHOULD be
permitted to access private state created by other smart con-
tracts involving the same participants”, but does not comply
with requirement EE-7.1e-DataAccessDifferentParticipants,
that a “...smart contract operating on private state MUST
NOT be permitted to access private state created by other
smart contracts involving different participants”.
EE-7.1f-FileDecentralizedStorage: IPFS [23] and Swarm
[24] [25] are the major decentralized storage techniques
discussed in the context of Ethereum. Both IPFS and Swarm
operate off-chain. Both technologies are at Proof of Concept
phase of development, with IPFS being more mature. The
requirement words, “no artificial off-chain file-storage add-
ons are needed”, rules out both. As such, Quorum does not
comply with this requirement.
Quorum supports the standard EVM opcodes and does
not have any additional EVM opcodes. As such, requirement
EE-7.2a-EvmOpCodes is complied with and requirement
EE-7.2b-EvmExtendedOpCodes is not.
EE-7.2c-PublicStateSync: This requirement relates to
a node’s ability to synchronise public state with public
Ethereum nodes on Ethereum MainNet. Quorum is not able
to synchronise with Ethereum MainNet as the transaction
format used by Quorum is not compatible with Ethereum
MainNet. Quorum adds a bit flag to the “V” field of transac-
tions to indicate if a transaction is private or public. Adding
this bit flag to the “V” field means that Ethereum MainNet
clients will not be able to process transactions form Quorum
nodes. Quorum is not compliant with this requirement.
EE-7.2d-PrecompiledContracts: This requirement re-
quires that implementations allow users to submit contracts
to be compiled and stored as precompiled contracts which
can be executed later. Quorum does not provide this capa-
bility.
Requirements EE-7.2e-TEE and EE-7.2f-
TEEConfigurableEncryption relate to executing contracts in
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Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). Quorum does not
support the use of TEEs and hence does not comply with
these requirements.
Requirements EE-7.2.1a-Finality to EE-7.3k-
ConsensusConfig relate to consensus algorithms. Quorum
currently supports three Proof of Authority (PoA)
consensus algorithms: Quorum Chain Consensus [17]
(now deprecated), Raft [26], and Istanbul Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (IBFT) [27]. The consensus algorithm
is configurable at start-up. Once the algorithm has been
set, it can’t be changed. For each of the PoA algorithms,
transactions are considered final once they are included
in a block. Quorum nodes can not form consensus on
Ethereum MainNet as Quorum does not support the Proof
of Work consensus algorithm used on Ethereum MainNet.
As such, Quorum complies with requirements EE-7.2.1a-
Finality, EE-7.3b-MultipleConsensusAlgorithms, EE-7.3c-
PrivateConsensusAlg, EE-7.3f-ConsensusAlgDocumented,
EE-7.3g-ConsensusAlgModularCon, EE-7.3i-
ConsensusIBFT, EE-7.3j-ConsensusOther and does not
comply with requirements EE-7.3a-MainNetConsensus and
EE-7.3d-MainNetConsensusAlg.
EE-7.3e-SidechainConsensusAlg: Any PoA, such as
IBFT consensus algorithm should allow sidechain clients
to form consensus on a sidechain. Quorum complies with
this requirement.
EE-7.3h-ConsensusInOutOfBand: Quorum supports in-
band communications for consensus, and as such supports
this requirement.
EE-7.3k-ConsensusConfig: This requirement indicates
that the consensus algorithm for public, private, and
sidechains should be configurable. Given Quorum only sup-
ports private networks, and is able to configure the consen-
sus algorithm for that network, it is deemed to support this
requirement.
3.2.6. Network Layer. Quorum uses the standard Ethereum
DEV Peer to Peer (DEVp2p) protocol [28] for commu-
nications between nodes for the “public” chain. Over the
DEVp2p wire protocol, Quorum modifies the Eth protocol to
have the “private” flag in the “V” field, and other changes to
support IBFT. Quorum uses a custom, undocumented, com-
munications protocol to communicate between Constellation
nodes, which here will be named, “Constellation Protocol”.
Constellation Protocol does not use DEVp2p as the wire
protocol.
EE-8.1a-Enode: Nodes are identified and advertised us-
ing the Ethereum enode URL format [enode]. Quorum is
compliant with this requirement.
The intent of EE-8.1b-DevP2P is that all inter-node com-
munications should use the DEVp2p protocol as the wire
protocol which higher layer protocols use. Constellation
Protocol does not use DEVp2p as its wire protocol, and
as such Quorum is not compliant with this requirement.
EE-8.1c-Eth62Eth63: Quorum does not support eth/62
and eth/63 versions of the Ethereum protocol for the “pub-
lic” blockchain. It supports protocols which are similar, but
not the same. As such, Quorum does not comply with this
requirement.
Requirement EE-8.1d-NewProtocols indicates that im-
plementations may add new high level Ethereum protocols
to work on top of the DEVp2p protocol. Quorum’s modi-
fications to the Eth protocol could be deemed to be such
extensions. As such, Quorum does not comply with this
requirement.
Quorum does not support relaying of private data via
proxy nodes. As such, it does not comply with requirement
EE-8.1e-RelayNodes.
3.2.7. Anti-Spam. Quorum does not provide any anti-spam
mechanisms so attacking nodes can be stopped. As such,
Quorum does not comply with this requirement.
3.2.8. Cross-client Compatibility. The requirements in this
section relates to compatibility with Ethereum MainNet and
standard APIs.
EE-10a-PublicEthCompatibility states that, “Enterprise
Ethereum clients SHOULD be compatible with the public
Ethereum network to the greatest extent possible.” The
words, “to the greatest extent possible” are ambiguous.
The intent of the requirement was that Enterprise Ethereum
clients should be public chain compatible, and offer a su-
perset of features. Quorum is not MainNet compatible, and
as such, does not comply with this requirement.
EE-10b-ExtendedApisSuperset: Quorum adds APIs to
submit private transactions, over and above the public
Ethereum APIs. These APIs are added such that they are
a superset of the public Ethereum APIs. As such, Quorum
complies with this requirement.
3.2.9. Synchronisation and Disaster Recovery. EE-11a-
FastSync: As Quorum is a fork of geth, it supports the same
fast synchronisation mode that standard geth does. This can
be used to synchronise the public state. As the new client
can not be a party to existing contracts, there will be no
private state to be synchronised. As such, Quorum supports
this requirement.
EE-11b-BackupRestore: Quorum does not support a
mechanism for backing up and restoring nodes. A Quorum
node could be taken off-line, backed up, and then restarted,
however that is not the intention of this requirement. The
intention of this requirement is for nodes to be able to be
backed-up whilst they are operational. This requirement is
particularly important to Quorum as each node in a Quorum
network is likely to hold different private state, as each node
is likely to have been involved in different private transac-
tions. As such, each Quorum node must back-up its private
state or its map of message digests to private transaction
encrypted payload. An alternative is that a Quorum node
which has experienced a failure, when it comes back on-line,
can request that all nodes which previously communicated
with it re-submit all previous transactions. There is however
no guarantee that all nodes will respond with all previous
transactions.
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3.2.10. Additional Blockchain Requirements. The follow-
ing paragraphs analyse how Quorum meets the additional
blockchain requirements.
Quorum does not implement any API permissioning.
As such, it does not comply with requirements BC-1a-
ApiCallPermissioning, BC-1b-EthereumAccountWhitelist
and BC1c-TransactionTypePermissioning.
Quorum does not encrypt the private state which
is the result of transactions being executed. As such,
Quorum does not comply with requirement BC-1d-
PrivateStateAuthenticatedEncryption.
BC-2a-OrganisationallyAwareConsensus: No existing
consensus algorithms are explicitly organisationally aware.
IBFT and other algorithms could possibly be operated such
that each organisation operates one validator node, and have
any other nodes they operate as observer nodes. If an organi-
sation’s validator node failed, they organisation could detect
this and then nominate another node as their observer node.
This however, does not provide the automatic redundancy
typically associated with blockchain systems. Given this,
Quorum is not deemed to support this requirement.
BC-3a-DiscoverableBootstrapInfo: Quorum does not
provide any mechanism to discover new parties. All con-
figuration information must be shared out of band prior to
a participant becoming a party to a consortium network.
BC-4a-ArchitecturalDecentralization: The private en-
crypted transaction payloads for a node only exist on that
node. This information must be backed-up. If a node fails,
other nodes can be asked to resend private transaction
payloads. There is however, no guarantee that nodes will re-
send those transactions. As such, Quorum is architecturally
centralised, and does not meet this requirement.
BC-4b-PoliticalDecentralization: Quorum does not have
any political centralisation points. Beyond the nodes them-
selves, which are operated by individual organisations, there
are no political centralisation points.
Quorum supports Whisper. This allows node to one or
more node and broadcast communications. Whisper includes
an anti-spam mechanism such that prior to a message being
forwarded by a node, the node must complete a mini-
Proof of Work style time hard problem. As such, Quo-
rum complies with requirements BC-5a-OffchainOrgToOrg,
BC-5b-OffchainAll, BC-5c-OffchianAntiSpam, and BC-5d-
Whisper.
3.2.11. Additional Sidechain Requirements. Quorum does
not support sidechains and as such does not implement the
sidechain requirements. Quorum does pin private transac-
tions, and hence the private state, to Quorum’s public chain
when it sends a transaction onto the public network. How-
ever, this is how Quorum pins its private smart contract state
to its blockchain, and is not related to sidechain pinning.
If Quorum is used in conjunction with Kaleido’s Relay
technology [29], then the state of the Quorum blockchain
can be pinned to Ethereum MainNet. Pinning participants
can be shielded and the pinning rate can be configured. A
method of contesting pins is proposed. The transaction rate
is however not shielded and there is no concept of a cipher
text observer. As such requirements SC-4a-Pinning, SC-4b-
PinningParticipantShielding, SC-4d-PinningContesting, and
SC-4f-PinningConfiguration are complied with assuming the
use of Kaleido’s Relay technology.
3.3. Parity Technologies’ Private Transactions
3.3.1. Introduction. Parity Technologies has created a pri-
vate transaction and smart contract capability in which a
private contract’s code and state are stored encrypted inside
a public contract. The public contract could be stored on
a consortium chain or on Ethereum MainNet. The private
transaction capabilities sits on top of Parity’s existing Parity
Ethereum Client.
To perform a private transaction, a sender creates a
transaction with the required function call on the private
contract. They send that transaction to a list of validators.
The validators each get the encrypted state and code of the
private contract from the public contract. They decrypt the
code and state, and execute the function which was in the
transaction submitted by the sender. They then encrypt the
updated state and sign the updated state and return this to
the sender. The sender then submits a transaction on the
public contract to update the encrypted state of the private
contract. The private state is updated if all of the validators
have signed the updated encrypted state.
The following sections analyse how Parity Technologies’
Private Transactions meets the Enterprise Ethereum Client
Specification requirements and the additional Sidechain re-
quirements. The analysis undertaken has been based on Par-
ity’s 1.11Beta documentation for Private Transactions [15],
Parity’s Permissioning Model documentation [30], Parity’s
private transaction contract source code and test code [31],
and Parity’s main codebase on GitHub [32].
3.3.2. Application Layer. As Parity is an Ethereum client
which supports standard Ethereum APIs and protocols, it al-
lows users to make use of many of the tools which have been
and continue to be created for use with Ethereum Clients.
The paragraphs below analyse the Application Layer re-
quirements.
EE-4.1a-DApp: Parity does not support the JSON-RPC
API Enterprise Ethereum extension described in EE-5.3.1b-
JsonRpcTransactionAsyncExt, and as such does not comply
with this requirement.
EE-4.3a-Tools: Parity’s private contracts could be de-
bugged by initially developing them as public contracts. No
specific deployment and debugging tools for Parity’s Private
Contracts are described in the documentation. In particular,
no tools appear to exist for creating private transactions or
deploying private contracts. As such, Parity is not deemed
to comply with the requirement to “provide deployment and
debugging tools for Enterprise Ethereum smart contracts”.
EE-4.3b- FormalVerification: Any formal verification
methods which become available for use with standard
Ethereum are likely to work with Enterprise Ethereum con-
tracts in Parity. As such, Parity should be deemed to comply
with this requirement.
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3.3.3. Tooling Layer. Parity’s Private Transaction capability
does not use a network of nodes which communicate using
peer-to-peer communications. It uses a static list of validator
nodes which are specified programmatically at start-up. In
the current implementation, this list of nodes can not be
updated. Given this, Parity complies with requirement EE-
5.1.1a-StaticStartUp which requires a static list of start-
up nodes, requirement EE-5.1.1c-WhitelistNodes which re-
quires implementations have the ability to list permissioned
nodes, and EE-5.1.1e-WhitelistViaAPI which requires the
list of nodes to be able to be specified programmatically.
As Parity does not run a peer-to-peer network of Val-
idator nodes, the concept of discovery and blacklisting
nodes does not make sense. As such, requirements EE-
5.1.1b-DisableDiscovery, EE-5.1.1d-BlacklistNodes, and
EE-5.1.1f-BlacklistViaAPI are not applicable.
EE-5.1.1g-CertifyNodes: There is no way to certify the
identity of nodes. As such, Parity does not comply with this
requirement.
EE-5.1.1h-Organization: Parity does not provide any
mechanism to group validator nodes according to which
organisation they belong to. As such, Parity does not comply
with this requirement.
Parity does not provide any mechanism to authenticate
users of the JSON RPC API. The technology stack shown
on Parity’s website indicates that they plan to create a
Secure Data Access Control System and an ID Verification
system. However, there is no documentation or examples
to explain these technologies. The inference that the
author has made is that these technologies are planned,
but do not currently exist. As such, there is no ability
to whitelist or blacklist participant identities who are
permitted to submit transactions or use any other API.
Parity does not comply with requirements EE-5.1.2a-
WhitelistParticipants, EE-5.1.2b-BlacklistParticipants,
EE-5.1.2c-WhitelistParticipantsViaAPI, EE-5.1.2e-
CertifyParticipants, and EE-5.1.2f-GroupsRoles. The
requirement EE-5.1.2d-BlacklistParticipantsViaAPI is
conditional on the blacklisting support from requirement
EE-5.1.2b-BlacklistParticipants. As such, this requirement is
not applicable. Ethereum Accounts submitting transactions
can be permissioned based on transaction type [30]. This
type of permissioning is covered by the requirement
BC1c-TransactionTypePermissioning; see section 2.2.1.
EE-5.1.3a-SmartContractPermissioning: Parity allows
contracts written in any Ethereum Virtual Machine language.
This allows application developers to write their contracts
such that they use address based permissioning in their
smart contracts. This allows Parity to comply with this
requirement.
EE-5.1.3b-RuntimeConfigUpdate: Parity’s private trans-
action wrapping contract, as written, does not offer the
ability to update the list of validators [33]. As such, as
written, Parity’s Private Transaction code does not comply
with this requirement.
EE-5.1.3c-ConfigOptions: Parity’s permissioning is set-
up using contracts, with the contracts being referenced from
a configuration file. The private contract capability is all
configured at start-up time via a contract call. As such,
Parity’s Private Transaction capability does not, ”provide
configuration through the use of flat files, command-line
options, or configuration management system interfaces.”
EE-5.1.3d-LocalKeyManagement: Parity offers its Par-
ity Secret Store technology to store keys locally us-
ing a threshold encryption scheme [34]. It does not ap-
pear to support external key generation and storage or
Hardware Security Modules. As such, Parity complies
with EE-5.1.3d-LocalKeyManagement but does not comply
with EE-5.1.3e-SecureExternalKeyGenStore and EE-5.1.3f-
HardwareSecurityModules.
The paragraphs below analyse the integration and de-
ployment tools related requirements.
EE-5.2.1a-IntegrationLibraries: Web3j [19] has support
for some Parity specific APIs, but not for Parity’s Private
Transaction specific functions. However, Parity’s own li-
brary [35] does have support for these functions. Parity
complies with this requirement.
Parity does not support enterprise software deploy-
ment and configuration systems, software fault reporting
capabilities, performance management capabilities, secu-
rity management interaction capabilities, historical anal-
ysis, or enterprise management systems. As such, the
following requirements are not supported: EE-5.2.2a-
EntDeployment, EE-5.2.2b-EntFaultReporting, EE-5.2.2c-
EntPerformanceManage, EE-5.2.2d-EntSecurity, EE-5.2.2e-
EntHistoricalAnalysis, EE-5.2.2f-EntManagementSystems.
Parity supports the public Ethereum JSON-RPC API
but does not support the eth sendTransactionAsync
API. As such, it complies with requirement EE-
5.3.1a-JsonRpcPublicEth but does not comply with
EE-5.3.1b-JsonRpcTransactionAsyncExt or EE-5.3.1c-
JsonRpcUnimplemented.
EE-5.3.2a-InterChainInteraction: Parity supports a tech-
nology called Parity Bridge [36] which allows for the cre-
ation of ERC20 tokens on a PoA chain which are backed
by Ether on Ethereum MainNet. This inter-chain technology
does not provide “inter-chain mediation capabilities” for
Parity’s Private Transaction capabilities however. As such,
Parity does not comply with this requirement.
EE-5.3.3a-Oracles: An Oracle could execute inside a
secure enclave. It could act as a private transaction submitter,
and call private contract APIs. As such, Parity complies with
this requirement.
The paragraphs below analyse the privacy and scaling
related requirements.
EE-6.1.1a-OnChainSecurity: Parity is able to support
improved on-chain security as it becomes available. For ex-
ample, Parity users gained access to zkSnark support when
the Byzentium release which implements the ECC scalar
multiplication, ECC point addition, and pairing checks, pre-
compiled contracts [22] was released.
EE-6.1.2a-PrivTransMethods: Parity private transaction
senders communicate private transaction payloads directly
to individual validators. The validators update the state of
the private contract and return the signed encrypted updated
state. The transaction sender submits a public transaction
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with the updated encrypted state and signatures of all val-
idators to update the private contract’s state. If the valida-
tors are viewed as participants of the contract, in addition
to the transaction submitters, then the private transaction
method can be viewed as restricted private transactions.
Though the encrypted state is communicated to the entire
blockchain, the private transaction payload is only transmit-
ted to and readable by direct participants of the transaction.
Given Parity implements private restricted transactions, re-
quirements EE-6.1.2i-UnrestrictedRecipientMasking to EE-
6.1.2q-UnrestrictedTransactions are Not Applicable. Given
Parity does not store private transaction payloads, re-
quirements EE-6.1.2b-RestrictedPayloadMaskingStored and
EE-6.1.2d-RestrictedMetadataMaskingStored related to pri-
vate transaction payload storage are not applicable. Re-
quirements EE-6.1.2f-RestrictedPayloadRelayStore and EE-
6.1.2g-RestrictedMetadataTransitStore related to relay nodes
are also not applicable as Parity’s Private Transactions do
not use relay nodes.
Private Transactions are communicated directly with
Validator nodes over TLS. As such, Parity complies with the
requirements EE-6.1.2c-RestrictedPayloadMaskingTransit
and EE-6.1.2e-RestrictedMetadataMaskingTransit to
encrypt the payload and metadata whilst in transit.
Requirement EE-6.1.2h-RestrictedDefaultSecure is not
applicable as the JSON RPC API eth sendTransactionAsync
call is not implemented.
EE-6.1.2r-PrivateTransactionAddParticipants: The list of
nodes which can update the Parity Private Contract is the
list of Validators. There is no way to add a new validator
to a private contract. As such, Parity does not comply with
this requirement.
EE-6.1.2s-PrivateTransactionConsensus: All validators
must agree on any update to the private contract state,
thus achieving consensus on all private transactions. Parity
complies with this requirement.
EE-6.1.3a-OffchainTrustedExecution: Parity does not
support off-chain execution in a trusted execution environ-
ment. As such, Parity does not comply with this require-
ment.
EE-6.2.1a-ImprovedOnchainProcessing: When
improved on-chain processing becomes available, more
transactions to update the private state will be able to be
executed. As each contract can only have one state change
per block, this would have to take the form of more private
contracts executing, rather than the one contract executing
more transactions. As such, this requirement is deemed
complied with, though with the caveat that the limitation of
one transaction per block means that to take advantage of
the improved on-chain processing users need to have more
private smart contracts.
EE-6.2.2a-OffchainProcessing: Each execution of a pri-
vate transaction in Parity is done off-chain. The encrypted
state is read from the distributed ledger using a View call and
the encrypted updated state is written back using a standard
transaction. The processing of the private transactions them-
selves are done in Validators nodes. These Validator nodes
do not need to be nodes which are processing transactions on
the blockchain. As such, this requirement is complied with
because the private transaction process is done off-chain.
EE-6.2.3a-ArchivePrivateState: Parity does not explicitly
provide for the ability to archive private state. That said, it
could be imagined that the encrypted state could be read,
archived, and replaced with a “dummy” empty updated
encrypted state. Hence, Parity has the ability to implement
this feature.
EE-6.2.3d-NewGenesisBlock: There is no genesis block
used with Parity Private Transactions technology. As such,
this requirement is not applicable.
3.3.4. Core Blockchain Layer. The paragraphs below anal-
yse the core blockchain requirements.
EE-7.1a-StoragePubEth: Parity is a public Ethereum
client. The data storage available to the public Ethereum
client are available to the private transaction capability. As
such, Parity complies with this requirement.
EE-7.1b-StorageForOptionalOffchain: Parity does not
implement off-chain storage for the private transactions.
EE-7.1c-SeparateStoragePerNetwork: Parity stores the
private contract state on the public chain. As such, it does
not comply with the requirement to store private “network”
data separately from other private “network” data and sep-
arately from public network data.
Parity Private Contracts can not access the private state
of other contracts. As such, Parity does not comply with re-
quirement EE-7.1d-DataAccessSameParticipants to be able
to access private data for private contracts with the same net-
work participants, but does comply with the requirement EE-
7.1e-DataAccessDifferentParticipants to not allow access in
cases of different participants.
EE-7.1f-FileDecentralizedStorage: As per the analysis in
section 3.2.5 for Quorum, there are no existing on-chain
decentralised file storage technologies. As such, Parity does
not comply with this requirement.
Parity supports the standard EVM opcodes and does not
have any additional EVM opcodes. As such, requirement
EE-7.2a-EvmOpCodes is complied with and requirement
EE-7.2b-EvmExtendedOpCodes is not.
EE-7.2c-PublicStateSync: Parity supports the ability to
synchronise the public state with other public Ethereum
nodes.
EE-7.2d-PrecompiledContracts: This requirement re-
quires that implementations allow users to submit contracts
to be compiled and stored as precompiled contracts which
can be executed later. Parity does not provide this capability.
Requirements EE-7.2e-TEE and EE-7.2f-
TEEConfigurableEncryption relate to executing contracts
in Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). Parity does not
support the use of TEEs and hence does not comply with
these requirements.
3.3.5. Execution Sublayer. Requirements EE-7.2.1a-
Finality to EE-7.3k-ConsensusConfig relate to consensus
algorithms. Parity requires all Validator nodes to agree on
a private state change as a result of a private transaction,
and then the resulting private state update is included in
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the public blockchain based on the consensus algorithm
being used on the public blockchain. The public blockchain
supports Ethash Proof of Work (PoW), the algorithm used
to establish consensus on Ethereum MainNet, and two
PoA algorithms: Authority Round (Aura) and Tendermint
(experimental only) [37]. As such, Parity complies with
the requirements EE-7.3a-MainNetConsensus and EE-7.3d-
MainNetConsensusAlg related to forming consensus on
Ethereum MainNet.
EE-7.2.1a-Finality: When Aura is used, the finality can
be determined based on the step duration, number of val-
idator nodes, and the number of faulty nodes allowed. As
such, this requirement is complied with.
The requirement EE-7.3b-
MultipleConsensusAlgorithms, appears to be complied
with, given Ethash, Aura, and Tendermint are supported.
However, there is only one algorithm supported for private
transaction consensus. As this algorithm has to be used
in conjunction with the other algorithms, Parity does not
comply with this requirement.
EE-7.3c-PrivateConsensusAlg: This requirement is com-
plied with as algorithms which allow consensus to be formed
on a consortium network, namely Aura, are supported. The
Aura consensus algorithm could be used on a sidechain,
and hence requirement EE-7.3e-SidechainConsensusAlg is
supported.
EE-7.3f-ConsensusAlgDocumented: The Ethash, Aura,
and Tendermint algorithms are documented [37]. As such,
Parity conforms with this requirement.
EE-7.3g-ConsensusAlgModularConf: The implementa-
tions of each consensus algorithm are in separate directories
of the Parity source tree. Each public algorithm is config-
urable, with parameters supplied by values in the “chain
config file” which is passed into the parity executable
as a command line argument. However, there is no way to
configure the Private Transaction consensus algorithm. As
such, Parity does not comply with the requirements EE-7.3g-
ConsensusAlgModularConf and EE-7.3k-ConsensusConfig
which require configurable consensus.
EE-7.3h-ConsensusInOutOfBand: Parity’s Private Trans-
actions uses both out-of-band communications for consen-
sus, and as such supports this requirement. Transaction
senders communicate directly with Validators, create the
signed updated state, and submit that as a transaction. The
transaction sender co-ordinates the consensus out-of-band
relative to the Ethereum node to Ethereum node communi-
cations, and then submits the transaction to the public chain.
EE-7.3i-ConsensusIBFT: Parity’s Private Transactions
feature does not support Istanbul Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(IBFT) consensus algorithm [EIP-650], and as such does
not comply with this requirement. It does support other
consensus algorithms, so it complies with requirement EE-
7.3j-ConsensusOther.
3.3.6. Network Layer. Requirements EE-8.1a-Enode, EE-
8.1b-DevP2P, and EE-8.1c-Eth62Eth63 relate to the imple-
mentation using standard Ethereum communications mecha-
nisms and addressing to communicate between nodes. Parity
complies with all of these requirements as it is a client which
is able to operate on Ethereum MainNet.
Requirement EE-8.1d-NewProtocols indicates that im-
plementations may add new high level Ethereum protocols
to work on top of the DEVp2p protocol. Parity has added
some protocols to work on top of DEVp2p such as the
Parity Light Protocol. As such, Parity complies with this
requirement.
EE-8.1e-RelayNodes: Parity’s Private Transactions do
not support the concept of relay nodes.
3.3.7. Anti-Spam. To submit a private state update, a trans-
action must be submitted on the public blockchain. If this
blockchain is Ethereum MainNet, then uses need to spend
“Ether” to buy “gas”. As such, the amount of spurious
transactions created by attackers or malfunctioning nodes
is limited due to the cost of such behaviour. As such,
requirement EE-9a-AntiSpam is complied with, assuming an
Ethereum MainNet deployment. However, for a consortium
deployment, no such economic disincentive exists. As such,
Parity partially complies with this requirement.
3.3.8. Cross-client Compatibility. The requirements in this
section relates to compatibility with Ethereum MainNet
and standard APIs. Parity is an Ethereum Client capable
of operating its Private Transactions on Ethereum Main-
Net. It extends the features of existing Ethereum APIs.
As such, Parity is complies with requirements EE-10a-
PublicEthCompatibility and EE-10b-ExtendedApisSuperset.
3.3.9. Synchronisation and Disaster Recovery. Parity sup-
ports the snapshotting of blockchains at specific block num-
bers. A Parity node can then be started based on that
snapshot, and fast synchronised to be up to date using a
feature called warp-sync. As such, Parity complies with
requirements EE-11a-FastSync and EE-11b-BackupRestore.
3.3.10. Additional Blockchain Requirements. The follow-
ing paragraphs analyse how Parity meets the additional
blockchain requirements described in this paper.
Parity does not implement any API permission-
ing at the node level. As such, it does not comply
with requirements BC-1a-ApiCallPermissioning and BC-1b-
EthereumAccountWhitelist. Parity does allow a transaction
type permissioning contract to be deployed which speci-
fies which accounts can execute which type of transaction
[30]. As such, Parity complies with requirement BC1c-
TransactionTypePermissioning.
Parity encrypts the code and state of a Private
Contract using AES/CTR with an AES 128 bit key.
AES/CTR is not an authenticated encryption technique.
As such, Parity does not comply with requirement BC-1d-
PrivateStateAuthenticatedEncryption.
BC-2a-OrganisationallyAwareConsensus: Parity’s Pri-
vate Transaction technology does not support an Organisa-
tionally Aware Consensus algorithm, and as such does not
comply with this requirement.
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BC-3a-DiscoverableBootstrapInfo: Parity does not pro-
vide any mechanism to discover new parties. All configu-
ration information must be shared out of band prior to a
participant becoming a party to a consortium network.
BC-4a-ArchitecturalDecentralization: Parity’s Private
Contracts being stored inside public contracts facilitate
this solution being architecturally decentralised. The secret
stores used to encrypt and decrypt the code and state can be
set-up in a decentralised manner. As such, Parity complies
with this requirement.
BC-4b-PoliticalDecentralization: Beyond the nodes
themselves, which are operated by individual organisations,
Parity has no political centralisation points.
Parity’s support of the Whisper [38] protocol allows
node to one or more node and broadcast communica-
tions. Whisper includes an anti-spam mechanism such
that prior to a message being forwarded by a node, the
node must complete a mini-Proof of Work style time
hard problem. As such, Parity complies with require-
ments BC-5a-OffchainOrgToOrg, BC-5b-OffchainAll, BC-
5c-OffchianAntiSpam, and BC-5d-Whisper.
3.3.11. Additional Sidechain Requirements. Parity does
not support sidechains and as such does not implement the
sidechain requirements. Parity does store the encrypted state
of a private contract onto the public chain. However, this
is not the same as cross-chain pinning. In Parity, there is
only one blockchain on which both private and public smart
contracts reside. There is no pinning of private state from
one blockchain onto another chain.
3.4. Hyperledger Fabric
3.4.1. Introduction. Hyperledger Fabric [16] [39] [5] is a
distributed ledger platform originally created by IBM and
now hosted by The Linux Foundation. The platform executes
smart contracts, called “chaincode”, which can be written
in any language, in Docker containers. Private transactions
execute within “channels” such that only the participants of
the transaction see the transaction.
Organisations can operate one or more nodes. Each node
has an identity in the form of an X.509 certificate. Each
organisation operates a Membership Service Provider (MSP)
which issues identities for the nodes, TLS root certificates,
and certificates for users of the nodes. The MSP uses the
Fabric CA to issue certificates and Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRL). Anchor Peers are special nodes which can
be contacted to find out information about other nodes
belonging to an organisation. To establish a network, the
IP address of the Anchor Peer and the root CA certificate
for the organisation needs to be shared out-of-band with
all other organisations which will be on the network. To
improve resistance to failure, an organisation could operate
more than one Anchor node.
A Hyperledger Fabric channel can be thought of as
a “subnet” within the overall network for performing pri-
vate transactions between two or more organisations. The
Orderer System Channel is a special channel between all
Orderer nodes on the network. A channel config transaction
which includes information about the Anchor Peers for each
organisation involved in a channel is executed on the Orderer
System Channel to create an Application Channel. The
channel configuration can be updated, for example to add
an organisation to the channel, by executing a configuration
update transaction.
To process a transaction, a participant submits a pro-
posed transaction to Endorsing nodes. Each endorsing node
executes the transaction and returns to the participant signed
copies of the state before and after the transaction was
executed. Some endorsing nodes may have out of date state,
which means that the returned values from endorsing nodes
may be inconsistent. Based on the “endorsement policy”, the
participant may need to have all endorsing nodes return the
same state, or may be able to proceed with only a subset of
endorsements. The participant then submits the signed trans-
action, with the endorsed before and after states to Ordering
nodes. The Ordering nodes come to a consensus on the order
of transactions within a block. The block is broadcast to all
nodes. All nodes then validate the transactions, checking
the endorsement policies and checking that the state before
a transaction matches the expected endorsed before state. If
the before state is not as expected, then the transaction is
marked as invalid. The endorsed after states are applied to
the distributed ledger.
Chaincode may call any other chaincode within a chan-
nel. No inter-channel communication is allowed. However,
all channels share the same un-encrypted state database,
which could allow carefully crafted malicious chaincode
from one channel to read state from chaincode from another
channel.
The following sections analyse how Hyperledger Fabric
meets the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification require-
ments and the additional Sidechain requirements. The anal-
ysis undertaken has been based on Hyperledger Fabric’s 1.1
documentation [39], Androulaki et al.’s analysis of Hyper-
ledger [5], and discussions with senior technical staff who
previously worked on Hyperledger Fabric at IBM.
3.4.2. Application Layer. EE-4.3a-Tools: Hyperledger
Composer [40] is a tool which allows for the creation and
deployment of Hyperledger Fabric Chaincode. There are
plans to implement formal verification of business logic in
Hyperledger Composer [41], but these features are yet to
be released. As such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with the
requirement to have to tools EE-4.3a-Tools but does not
comply with the requirement to have formal verification
tools, requirement EE-4.3b- FormalVerification.
3.4.3. Tooling Layer. EE-5.1.1a-StaticStartUp: Hyper-
ledger Fabric requires that a static list of Anchor nodes and
other nodes which can be on the network be shared out-
of-band. As such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with this
requirement to be able to specify a static list of start-up
nodes.
EE-5.1.1b-DisableDiscovery: Any node within an organ-
isation can contact one of the organisation’s Anchor nodes
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to discover all nodes which are on the channel. There is no
ability to disable this node discovery. As such, Hyperledger
Fabric does not comply with this requirement.
In Hyperledger Fabric organisations are whitelisted to
be part of a network and to be part of a channel. The
organisation can add nodes to be part of the network or
channel. This whitelisting is done in part by configuration
file and in part via API. Blacklisting is not supported.
As such, requirements EE-5.1.1c-WhitelistNodes, and EE-
5.1.1e-WhitelistViaAPI are complied with and requirement
EE-5.1.1d-BlacklistNodes is not supported which means that
requirement EE-5.1.1f-BlacklistViaAPI is not applicable.
EE-5.1.1g-CertifyNodes: Nodes are certified in Hyper-
ledger Fabric using the MSP. As such, it complies with this
requirement.
EE-5.1.1h-Organization: Hyperledger Fabric provides
the ability to group nodes as being part of an organisation,
meeting this requirement.
Participants who interact with a node’s API are identified
using certificates issued by the MSP. The list participants
allowed to interact with an API is limited by a whitelist
in the channel configuration. The participants’ capabilities
can be restricted to being read, write, or admin. The con-
figuration can be specified programmatically. Blacklisting is
not supported. Participants can be assigned roles. As such,
requirements EE-5.1.2a-WhitelistParticipants, EE-5.1.2c-
WhitelistParticipantsViaAPI, EE-5.1.2e-CertifyParticipants,
and EE-5.1.2f-GroupsRoles are complied with. Requirement
EE-5.1.2b-BlacklistParticipants is not supported, and re-
quirement EE-5.1.2d-BlacklistParticipantsViaAPI is not ap-
plicable.
EE-5.1.3a-SmartContractPermissioning: Chaincode in
Hyperledger Fabric can determine which identity cre-
ated a transaction and as such could implement a
“smart contract-based” permissioning scheme. EE-5.1.3b-
RuntimeConfigUpdate: Channel and network configuration
can be updated at run time without the need to restart.
EE-5.1.3c-ConfigOptions: Hyperledger Fabric can be con-
figured using files and command line options. EE-5.1.3d-
LocalKeyManagement: The MSP provides some key man-
agement capabilities. The Fabric CA which backs the MSP
can be configured to use a Hardware Security Module
(HSM). As such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with these
requirements.
EE-5.2.1a-IntegrationLibraries: This requirement is
complied with as a range of integration libraries exist for
Hyperledger Fabric including ones written in the go-lang
[42] and Java [43] programming languages.
Hyperledger Fabric operates nodes and chaincode as
Docker containers. Enterprise deployment tools which work
with Docker containers could be configured to deploy
and monitor deployments of Hyperledger Fabric. Hyper-
ledger Fabric has configurable logging. This logging can
be integrated into software fault reporting systems and
security management systems. Performance analysis tools
such as Performance Traffic Engine [44] can be used to
measure performance of Hyperledger Fabric in a range
of scenarios. Hyperledger Fabric does not support enter-
prise management systems using Common Management
Information Protocol (CMIP), Web-Based Enterprise Man-
agement (WBEM), or Application Service Management
(ASM) instrumentation. As such, requirements EE-5.2.2a-
EntDeployment, EE-5.2.2b-EntFaultReporting, EE-5.2.2c-
EntPerformanceManage, EE-5.2.2d-EntSecurity, EE-5.2.2e-
EntHistoricalAnalysis are complied with and requirement
EE-5.2.2f-EntManagementSystems is not.
EE-5.3.2a-InterChainInteraction: Hyperledger Fabric
provides no mechanism for inter-blockchain interaction
or for inter-Hyperledger Fabric channel communications.
As such, Hyperledger Fabric does not comply with this
requirement.
EE-5.3.3a-Oracles: An Oracle could run inside a trusted
enclave and then publish values to chaincode in a channel.
The Oracle would need to be configured with a valid identity
for the channel. In this way the Oracle could securely send
and receive data from chaincode.
3.4.4. Privacy and Scaling Layer. EE-6.1.1a-
OnChainSecurity: As Hyperledger Fabric chaincode is
executed in a Docker container, application implementers
can choose to use any on-chain security features such as
zkSnarks, Range Proofs and other techniques.
EE-6.1.2a-PrivTransMethods: Hyperledger Fabric’s
channel approach means that private transactions are only
transmitted to and readable only by the direct participants
of a transaction. As such, the restricted private transaction
requirements and not the unrestricted requirements are
applicable to Hyperledger Fabric.
Hyperledger Fabric stores transactions and state
in plaintext [39]. As of version 1.1, chaincode can
choose to encrypt data prior to storing state. The keys
used for this must be managed outside of Hyper-
ledger Fabric. Hyperledger Fabric communications trans-
actions in plaintext over TLS. Transactions can be en-
crypted using keys managed outside of Hyperledger Fab-
ric. The metadata however can not be encrypted. As
such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with the requirements
EE-6.1.2b-RestrictedPayloadMaskingStored and EE-6.1.2c-
RestrictedPayloadMaskingTransit, but does not comply with
requirements EE-6.1.2d-RestrictedMetadataMaskingStored
and EE-6.1.2e-RestrictedMetadataMaskingTransit.
Hyperledger Fabric does not support relay nodes. As
such, requirements EE-6.1.2f-RestrictedPayloadRelayStore
and EE-6.1.2g-RestrictedMetadataRelayStore are not appli-
cable.
EE-6.1.2r-PrivateTransactionAddParticipants:
Participants can be added to a Hyperledger Fabric
channel. This adds the participant to a private transaction,
thus complying with this requirement.
EE-6.1.2s-PrivateTransactionConsensus: Orderers form
consensus on the order of transactions in blocks for a
channel. As such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with the
requirement for nodes involved in a private transaction to
be able to form consensus.
EE-6.1.3a-OffchainTrustedExecution: Off-chain trusted
execution of Hyperledger Fabric chaincode is not yet sup-
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ported. It is however an active area of research which may
become available in due course [45].
Hyperledger Fabric executes chaincode in Docker con-
tainers. The Docker containers could call out to other
containers on other computers to perform computations
in parallel. This provides improved processing capabil-
ities which can be viewed as both on-chain and off-
chain. As such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with re-
quirements EE-6.2.1a-ImprovedOnchainProcessing and EE-
6.2.2a-OffchainProcessing.
EE-6.2.3a-ArchivePrivateState: Hyperledger Fabric al-
lows data to be backed up and restored. As such, Hyper-
ledger Fabric does not comply with this requirement.
Requirement EE-6.2.3d-NewGenesisBlock relates to
limiting the size of the blockchain by specifying a new gen-
esis block. Hyperledger Fabric does not offer this capability.
3.4.5. Core Blockchain Layer. EE-7.1b-
StorageForOptionalOffchain: Hyperledger Fabric does
not provide storage for use with off-chain operations. As
such, this requirement is not supported.
EE-7.1c-SeparateStoragePerNetwork: Hyperledger Fab-
ric supports multiple blockchains in the form of channels.
All channels are on the same overall consortium network,
however transactions on a channel are only between nodes
which are a part of the channel. As such, from the per-
spective of this requirement, Hyperledger Fabric supports
multiple networks. Hyperledger Fabric stores the blockchain
for each channel in a separate file, however the state for
all channels is stored in the same database [39]. As such,
Hyperledger Fabric does not comply with this requirement.
EE-7.1d-DataAccessSameParticipants: Hyperledger
Fabric allows chaincode operating within the same channel
to access other chaincode state in the same channel. As
such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with this requirement.
EE-7.1e-DataAccessDifferentParticipants: There is no
facility for chain code in one channel to call chaincode
in another channel. All data is stored in a common state
database. As such, Hyperledger Fabric does nt comply with
this requirement to not “permit to access private state created
by other smart contracts involving different participants”. It
could conceivably be possible for chaincode on one channel
reach the state of chaincode in a different channel.
EE-7.1f-FileDecentralizedStorage: Storing files in Hy-
perledger Fabric is facilitated by converting files to based64
encoded strings and storing strings. As such, it can store
files without, ”artificial off-chain file-storage add-ons are
needed.”
Brandenburger et al. [45] have produced research on op-
erating Hyperledger Fabric chaincode in a Trusted Execution
Environments (TEE). This research is however is not some-
thing which can be used in a Hyperledger Fabric production
environment at the moment. As such, Hyperledger Fabric
does not comply with requirements EE-7.2e-TEE or EE-
7.2f-TEEConfigurableEncryption.
EE-7.2.1a-Finality: Hyperledger Fabric uses Kafka [46]
as part of the ordering service to provide consensus. Trans-
actions can be considered final once they have been ordered
using Kafka, put into a block, and then validated by each
node. When a block is being validated by nodes, if a trans-
action’s input state does not match the current input state,
then a transaction is rejected and needs to be resubmitted. As
such, though this requirement that, “transactions SHOULD
be considered final after a defined interval or event.” [2] is
correct, participants using Hyperledger Fabric must ensure
that transaction included in blocks haven’t been rejected, to
ensure the transactions have been finalised.
Hyperledger Fabric is capable of supporting
multiple consensus algorithms. However, at present,
the only production grade algorithm supported is
Kafka. This algorithm could be used for private
channels or for sidechains. The consensus algorithm
is documented in Androulaki et al.’s paper [5].
Consensus information is communicated in-band. As
such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with the requirements
EE-7.3b-MultipleConsensusAlgorithms, EE-7.3c-
PrivateConsensusAlg, EE-7.3e-SidechainConsensusAlg,
EE-7.3f-ConsensusAlgDocumented, EE-7.3h-
ConsensusInOutOfBand, and EE-7.3j-ConsensusOther.
EE-7.3g-ConsensusAlgModularConf: The consensus al-
gorithm code is modular in the Hyperledger Fabric code-
base. Kafka must be configured with X.509 certificates. As
such, Hyperledger Fabric complies with the requirement for
the, “Consensus algorithm implementations SHOULD be
modular and configurable”.
EE-7.3i-ConsensusIBFT: As Hyperledger Fabric does
not support IBFT, this requirement is not met.
EE-7.3k-ConsensusConfig: When a channel is estab-
lished, the ordering service to be used for the channel
is specified. As such, the consensus algorithm is able to
be configured for each channel, thus complying with this
requirement.
3.4.6. Network Layer. EE-8.1e-RelayNodes: Relay nodes
are not supported by Hyperledger Fabric.
3.4.7. Anti-Spam. EE-9a-AntiSpam: Hyperledger Fabric
does not appear to support any anti-spam mechanisms.
Hyperledger Fabric assumes all parties on the network are
fully trusted. As such, Hyperledger Fabric does not comply
with this requirement.
3.4.8. Synchronisation and Disaster Recovery. EE-11a-
FastSync: Hyperledger Fabric does not appear to support any
accelerated synchronisation mechanism to get new nodes
synchronised quickly.
EE-11b-BackupRestore: Hyperledger Fabric does not
currently support the backing up and restoring of node data.
This is however an issue which is actively being discussed
[47].
3.4.9. Additional Enterprise Ethereum Client Require-
ments. Hyperledger Fabric restricts which accounts can
submit which transactions and has API permissioning.
For example, to deploy a new chaincode, the chain-
code which has been signed by the entities which own
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the code, must be deployed on a node which is a
part of the channel by a local MSP administrator us-
ing a signed transaction proposal [48]. As such, Hy-
perledger Fabric complies with the requirements BC-1a-
ApiCallPermissioning, BC-1b-EthereumAccountWhitelist,
and BC1c-TransactionTypePermissioning.
BC-1d-PrivateStateAuthenticatedEncryption:
Hyperledger Fabric does not encrypt the blockchain
state. As such, it does not comply with this requirement to
authenticated-encrypt the blockchain state.
BC-2a-OrganisationallyAwareConsensus: Hyperledger
Fabric’s Kafka isn’t an organisationally aware consensus
algorithm. It relies on each organisation only having a
single ordering node. As such, Hyperledger Fabric does not
comply with this requirement.
BC-3a-DiscoverableBootstrapInfo: Hyperledger Fabric
does not offer any ability to discover parties they have no
previous relationship with. As such, it does not comply with
this requirement.
BC-4a-ArchitecturalDecentralization: Hyperledger Fab-
ric’s architecture aims to have no single points of failure.
An organisation can have more than one anchor peer, though
typically only has one. The anchor peer needs to be con-
tactable for a channel to be created which includes the
organisation the anchor belongs to. The gossip protocol is
such that each organisation has a leader peer as the contact
point for the organisation for the channel. There is however a
leader fail-over mechanism. Additionally, each organisation
has a certificate authority and Membership Service Provides
(MSP) which issue identities. Though Hyperledger Fabric
has the ability to have primary and secondary nodes, for
example with the anchor peers, this is not the same as decen-
tralisation. If Hyperledger Fabric was a fully decentralised
solution, there would be no special peers, or any peer would
be able to automatically reconfigure itself to become any
peer type which has failed. As such, Hyperledger Fabric
does not meet this requirement.
BC-4b-PoliticalDecentralization: Hyperledger Fabric
networks and channels are operated by the members of
the network. They do not need a central organisation to
coordinate activities. As such, Hyperledger Fabric complies
with this requirement.
Hyperledger Fabric does not provide an off-chain
communications mechanism. As such, it does not com-
ply with requirements BC-5a-OffchainOrgToOrg, BC-5b-
OffchainAll, and BC-5c-OffchianAntiSpam.
3.4.10. Additional Sidechain Requirements. Hyperledger
Fabric implements a sidechain feature, which it calls,
“channels”. Identities who are authorised to create channels
are set-up programmatically using the MSP. However, there
is no blacklisting support. There is also no support to limit
which nodes or other organisations can send requests to
create a channel. As such, Hyperledger Fabric complies
with requirement SC-2a-EstablishmentApiWhitelist,
but not SC-1a-EstablishmentNodesWhitelist, SC-
1b-EstablishmentNodesBlacklist, and SC-2b-
EstablishmentApiBlacklist.
Hyperledger Fabric supports an API to create a chan-
nel [49]. However, there does not appear to be an API
to find an existing channel. As such the requirement SC-
3a-SidechainFindOrEstablishmentApi is partially supported.
Hyperledger Fabric APIs take a “channel” parameter, which
is equivalent to the concept of the “sidechain identifier”
parameter. As such, Hyperledger Fabric supports the SC-
3b-SidechainIdentifier requirement.
Hyperledger Fabric does not support sidechain state
pinning. As such, none of the pinning requirements SC-4a-
Pinning to SC-4f-PinningConfiguration are supported.
For sidechain systems to be effective, Ethereum clients
which support sidechains need to allow a multitude of
sidechains to operate simultaneously. In the example there
were three sidechain in addition to the management chain.
Ethereum Private Sidechain clients need to have a specific
requirement to support multiple clients.
SC-4g-MultipleSidechains: Hyperledger Fabric allows
for multiple channels to operate simultaneously. As such,
it complies with this requirement.
SC-5a-DataAccessDifferentParticipants: No cross-
channel communication is allowed in Hyperledger Fabric.
As such, it does not comply with this requirement.
SC-6a-SidechainArchive: Hyperledger Fabric does not
provide the facility to archive channels. As such, it does not
meet this requirement to be able to archive channels.
4. Comparison
Quorum, Parity, and Hyperledger Fabric are very differ-
ent platforms which approach private smart contracts very
differently. Despite those differences, all platforms provide
some fundamental features such as only allowing whitelisted
nodes to access a private contract (requirement EE-5.1.1c-
WhitelistNodes) and allowing for in-contract permission-
ing (requirement EE-5.1.3a-SmartContractPermissioning).
However, there are also many differences, as described in
the following paragraphs.
Hyperledger Fabric’s assumption that all nodes on the
network and all participants are trusted has meant that the
only production grade consensus algorithm offered by this
platform, Kafka, is not Byzantine Fault Tolerant. Parity’s
Private Transactions only has a single algorithm which
requires all participants to agree, and hence is not Byzantine
Fault Tolerant. Quorum offers two production grade con-
sensus algorithms of which one, IBFT is Byzantine Fault
Tolerant.
Protection of state is another point of difference. Parity’s
Private Transactions’ state is stored encrypted. Quorum and
Hyperledger Fabric do not encrypt the state. That said,
Parity’s state is only encrypted with AES/CTR, and not an
authenticated-encrypted algorithm such as AES/GCM. As
such, none of the platforms meet the requirement BC-1d-
PrivateStateAuthenticatedEncryption.
Parity is public chain compatible whereas Quorum is not.
Hyperledger Fabric, not being an Ethereum based platform
is also not public chain compatible.
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Hyperledger Fabric’s “channel” feature is similar to
sidechains. This has meant that it supports some of the
sidechain requirements. However, importantly, it does not
support any inter-channel communications. Neither Quorum
nor Parity offer any form of sidechain support.
Hyperledger Fabric’s system has the concept of “organ-
isation”, recognising that companies are likely to operate
more than one node, and as such meets the requirement EE-
5.1.1h-Organization. Neither Quorum nor Parity support the
concept of organisation.
Hyperledger Fabric does not support an off-chain secure
communications service. However, both Parity and Quorum
support the Whisper protocol, and as such support require-
ments BC-5a-OffchainOrgToOrg, BC-5b-OffchainAll, and
BC-5d-Whisper.
None of the platforms support the requirement BC-3a-
DiscoverableBootstrapInfo to bootstrap information about
an organisation they had not previously interacted with, so
that a blockchain can be established on-demand. Addition-
ally none of the platforms support the concept of relay
nodes, requirement EE-8.1e-RelayNodes.
All of the platforms were Politically Decentralised, how-
ever, only Parity fully fulfilled the requirement to be Archi-
tecturally Decentralised.
As can be seen from the above analysis, none of the
platforms meet all of the requirements at time of writing.
The section below proposes the architecture of a system
which meets the requirements laid out in this document.
5. Solution
5.1. Introduction
This section presents an overview of Ethereum Private
Sidechains.
5.2. Multi-Blockchain Architecture
The top level Ethereum Private Sidechain architectural
concept is presented in figure 5. In this architecture multiple
blockchains, known as sidechains, use Ethereum MainNet
as a management and coordination blockchain. Though
possibly indicating the title Ethereum Private Sidechains
is a misnomer, sidechains could be Ethereum based or
other blockchain platforms, for instance Hyperledger Fab-
ric channels. Additionally, though the sidechains all have
permissioning capabilities, some may be configured to be
permissionless, allowing any organisation to connect to the
sidechain.
As indicated by the lines in the diagram, some sidechains
may use Ethereum MainNet for management and coordina-
tion. Other sidechains may wish to have management and
coordination activities done on a separate sidechain which is
itself in turn managed on Ethereum MainNet. Having this
delegation model is advantageous for several reasons: the
gas cost on the sidechain could be set such that performing
management and coordination activities could be signifi-
cantly cheaper on the sidechain than on Ethereum MainNet.
Figure 5. Multi-Blockchain Architecture
Additionally, the sidechain could have its permissioning set
such that it was permissionless, allowing any organisation to
use it, or could be permissioned such that only consortium
members could use it. Another benefit of using a delegation
model is that it allows transactions which would occur on
Ethereum MainNet to be moved to a separate blockchain.
This means that the capabilities of Ethereum MainNet can
scale and means that the activities of the sidechain can
proceed even if MainNet is under heavy load as happened
due to the Crypto Kitties game [50] and other games which
use Ethereum MainNet [51].
This design allows the solution to meet the requirement
to have multiple sidechains (SC-4g-MultipleSidechains).
The overall solution would be MainNet compatible as the
solution requires a MainNet client to operate as a manage-
ment and configuration point. This would allow the solution
to meet the requirement EE-7.3a-MainNetConsensus. Indi-
vidual sidechains are unlikely to be MainNet compatible as
they are likely to be using Proof of Authority consensus
algorithms such as IBFT.
5.3. Ethereum Registration Authority
Ethereum Registration Authorities (ERA) are smart con-
tracts which organisations can use to determine bootstrap
information about other organisations such that they can
establish sidechains with them. The contracts map domain
name to the address of a delegate ERA and / or an Organ-
isational Information (OrgInfo) contract. OrgInfo contracts
hold a mapping of name-value pairs which can represent
arbitrary information, for example the enode addresses of
sidechain nodes and encryption keys. Any information cur-
rently held on Domain Name servers could be held in these
contracts.
Root ERAs are operated by companies which attest to
the fact that a domain name matches a company which
matches an Ethereum Address. Organisations can host their
own Delegate ERAs. An organisation can list the address of
their delegate ERA with one or more root ERAs.
In figure 6 there is a sidechain client which wishes
to determine bootstrap information for sc.example.com
and bank.co.uk. The sidechain client trusts two Root
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Figure 6. Root and Delegate Ethereum Registration Authorities
ERAs. sc.example.com is listed with both Root ERAs
and operates its own Delegate ERA, whereas bank.co.uk
is only listed in one Root ERA and does not oper-
ate its own Delegate ERA. The sidechain client asks
each Root ERA for information about the domains. If
the Root ERA does not contain information about the
domain being searched for, then the sidechain client
asks if it has information about the domain’s parent or
grand parent. That is, if the sidechain client was search-
ing for information about aa.bb.sc.example.com, it
would ask the Root ERA if it had information about
the domain aa.bb.sc.example.com, the parent do-
main bb.sc.example.com, the grand parent domain
aa.bb.sc.example.com, and so forth.
Information listed in the OrgInfo contracts is held as a
map of names and values. To provide extensibility the names
need to be formatted such that they can be uniquely ex-
tended. To limit the amount of gas cost, the names should be
a consistent single word (256 bits) size. With these ideas in
mind, the format for names is a Keccak-256 message digest
of the reverse domain order. Using a Keccak-256 message
digest means that any name will be exactly one word long.
Using reverse domain name order means that an organisation
that wishes to create their own names can do so safe in the
knowledge that they own the name space within the domain
that they control. Hence, example.com could define a
name com.example.app1.pubkey which might be for
a public key for an application. To provide interoperabil-
ity, common names should be standardised. For example,
perhaps org.ethereum.enode could be for enode ad-
dresses.
Having Root ERAs may appear to mean that this so-
lution will not meet the political decentralisation require-
ment, BC-4b-PoliticalDecentralization. However, organisa-
tions can choose to register their Delegate ERA or OrgInfo
contracts in as many Root ERAs as they wish. Additionally,
sidechain clients can choose which Root ERAs they trust.
ERAs which are known to be reputable are more likely to
attract organisations wishing to list with them and are more
likely to be used by sidechain clients. This could lead to a
degree of political centralisation.
5.4. Management and Pinning
To meet the requirement SC-4a-Pinning, this paper pro-
poses a Management and Pinning contract which resides on
Ethereum MainNet or on a sidechain used for managing
other sidechains. The Management and Pinning contract
specifies who are the participants of the sidechain and holds
information which pins the state of the sidechain to contract.
For each sidechain, there are masked and unmasked
participants. Unmasked Participants have their Ethereum
Addresses listed as being members of the sidechain. Being
unmasked allows the participant to vote to add and remove
other participants, to change the voting period and algo-
rithm, and to contest pins.
Masked Participants are participants that are listed
against a sidechain in a way that observers can not de-
termine their identity. These participants are represented
as a salted hash of their Ethereum Address. The masked
participant keeps the salt secret value off-chain. If they need
to unmask themselves, they present their secret salt to the
contract. This combined with their sending address is used
to create the calculated salted hash. If this calculated value
matches their masked participant value then they become an
unmasked participant. The method of masking participants
allows the solution to comply with the requirement SC-4b-
PinningParticipantShielding.
Pinning values are put into a map. All participants of a
sidechain agree on a Sidechain Secret. The Sidechain Secret
seeds a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). A new
256 bit value is generated each time an uncontested pin is
posted. The key in the map is calculated using the equations
shown below.
PrngV alue = PRNG.nextV alue (1)
MapKey = Keccak256(SidechainIdentifier,
PreviousP in, PrngV alue) (2)
Where the initial value of Previous Pin is zero. The
PRNG algorithm needs to be agreed upon by the sidechain
participants when the sidechain is being created.
Masked and unmasked participants of a sidechain ob-
serve the pinning map at the MapKey value waiting for the
next pin to be posted to that entry in the map. When the
pin value is posted, they can then determine if they wish
to contest the pin. To contest the pin, they submit to the
contract:
• Previous MapKey.
• PrngValue.
• Sidechain Identifier.
Submitting the previous value of the MapKey allows
the contract to fetch from its own storage the value of the
Previous Pin. The contract can then calculate the MapKey of
the contested pin by combining the Previous Pin, PrngValue
and Sidechain Identifier using the equation above. Given
the submitter of the transaction knows PrngValue which
combined with the Sidechain Identifier links the Previous
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MapKey and the calculated MapKey, it implies that the
MapKeys correspond to pins for the sidechain. The further
implication of knowing a value PrngValue is that the trans-
action submitter has access to the Sidechain Seed and are a
member of the sidechain.
Once a pin is marked as contested, the unmasked par-
ticipants of the sidechain must then vote on the validity
of the posted pin. At this point, masked participants will
need to unmask themselves to vote. This could be viewed
as analogous to a situation in which companies that have
a traditional private written agreement are in dispute. Un-
der normal circumstances the companies may be able to
keep their agreement private. However, in case of dispute,
the companies need to make public their agreement and
go to the courts to resolve the matter. Similarly, masked
participants need to unmask themselves if they wish to vote
on a disputed pin. This methodology for contesting pins
allows this solution to comply with requirement SC-4d-
PinningContesting.
Multiple sidechains could be managed from the one
Management and Pinning contract. This would be advan-
tageous because it would mean that the pin values for the
different sidechains could be put intermixed in the one
pinning map. This would hide the rate of pinning for any
one sidechain. This allows the solution to comply with SC-
4c-PinningTransactionRateShielding.
To meet requirement SC-4e-
PinningCipherTextObservers, sidechain participants may
choose to use a Quiet Guardian. This is an entity which
could be the only unmasked participant of a sidechain. It
could be configured to only see the encrypted transactions
and state of the sidechain, and post that encrypted state
as pins to the Management and Pinning contract. Having
a Quiet Guardian as the lone unmasked participant of a
sidechain allows the other sidechain participants to remain
anonymous, assuming no dispute.
5.5. Interchain Communications
Three types of inter-sidechain and inter-blockchain com-
munications are possible: reading, writing and transferring
value. Reading means executing a Solidity View function
which does not update the blockchain state. Writing means
executing function calls which result in transactions which
require updates to the blockchain. Value transfer relates to
transferring Ether or an ERC20 token [52] [53].
Any inter-sidechain communications requires correct
permissions, such that an entity can read form or write to the
target sidechain. In the case of a permissionless sidechain,
this would allow any entity to read from or write to it. In
the case of a permissioned sidechain reading or writing to
another permissioned sidechain, the participant’s Ethereum
Address used on each sidechain needs to be the same.
When a participant that is using one sidechain wishes
to perform a read from a target sidechain, they need to
ensure that the block number from the target sidechain is
referenced in the transaction. Doing this allows all nodes
which execute the transaction on the originating sidechain
read from the same context on the target sidechain. Nodes
on the originating sidechain need to assess whether they
perceive the block number on the target sidechain is recent
before accepting the transaction.
Inter-sidechain transactions which cause state updates on
a target sidechain is an area which needs further work. A
possible solution is to have each node on the originating
sidechain reference the same block of the target sidechain.
They can each perform a trial execution of the transaction
to see that they come to the same value.
Hashed Timelock Contracts [54] have been put forward
for inter-chain value transfer. It could be envisaged that
a participant could choose to put some Ether in escrow
in a contract on Ethereum MainNet. They could launch
a sidechain which issued them the same amount of Ether
previously escrowed. They could then use the concept of
Hashed Timelock Contracts to allow trustless transfer of
Ether between Ethereum MainNet and the sidechain. Given
a fixed total quantity of Ether on the sidechain, this would
allow for “Mass Conservation” between Ethereum MainNet
and the sidechain, where no additional Ether is created or
destroyed.
Building on the concepts of Hashed Timelock Contracts,
Thomas and Schwartz have proposed an Interledger Protocol
[55]. Either this technology or other similar technologies
could be used to allow inter-blockchain value transfers.
5.6. Sidechain Capable Ethereum Client Architec-
ture
Figure 7 shows a simplified architecture of an Enterprise
Ethereum Client which includes sidechain capability, show-
ing only JSON RPC calls and some network connections.
JSON RPC requests come from DApps represented in
the diagram by the stick figure. These go via a reverse proxy
which splits the traffic based on Sidechain Identifier. For
requests with no Sidechain Identifier, the requests are routed
to the MainNet Client. For requests with a Sidechain Iden-
tifier, requests are routed to the sidechain with the specified
Sidechain Identifier. Special requests to create sidechains are
routed to the Sidechain Creator.
When the Sidechain Creator receives a request over the
JSON RPC to create a sidechain, it checks that the request-
ing participant has been authorised to create sidechains, it
gathers bootstrap information from Ethereum Registration
Authorities to determine which nodes to connect establish
connections with, and instantiates a Sidechain Client. The
Sidechain Client contacts other Enterprise Ethereum Clients’
Sidechain Creators requesting they join the sidechain. These
remote Sidechain Creators check whether the requesting
node belongs to an organisation which is either whitelisted
or not blacklisted. Assuming the incoming request is from an
authorised organisation, the Sidechain Creator instantiates a
Sidechain Client which works with the remote Sidechain
Client to establish the sidechain network.
All APIs of the Enterprise Ethereum Client need to be
permissioned, ensuring that only authorised participants can
use them. To allow standard Ethereum APIs to be used,
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Figure 7. Sidechain Client Architecture
an appropriately permissioned participant could interact di-
rectly with the Sidechain Client API.
5.7. Adding and Removing Nodes and Organisa-
tions
Only nodes belonging to organisations which are a part
of a sidechain are authorised to communicate with other
nodes on a sidechain. The list of nodes belonging to an or-
ganisation can be found by looking up information from the
ERA. When an organisation wishes to add a node, it updates
its OrgInfo information, and then sends an indication to all
other organisations on the network. The other organisations
which are part of the sidechain can check the ERAs, and
establish communications with the new node.
To add an organisation to or remove an organisation from
a sidechain, unmasked participants for the sidechain in a
Management and Pinning contract propose and then vote on
adding or removing the organisation. Once the organisation
has been added, the ERA can be used to determine the nodes
to be added or removed from the sidechain network.
5.8. Encrypted State and Encrypted Transactions
The state of each sidechain needs to be authenticated en-
crypted using separate keys for each sidechain. This ensures
that sidechain state from different sidechains are mutually
encrypted. The reason why this is important is that in the
future, rather that individual companies operating Ethereum
nodes or sidechain nodes, a “sidechain hosting company”
might provides services to host the Sidechain Clients for an
individual. In a similar way to how cloud tenants expect
their data to be encrypted with a different key to other
tenants, users of sidechains will expect their data to be
separately encrypted. This one key per sidechain approach
could be achieved by having a root key and deriving the
key per sidechain from the root key based on the Sidechain
Identifier. Alternatively, each sidechain key could be ran-
domly generated, and a key manager could be used to store
sidechain keys based on Sidechain Identifier.
5.9. Hyperledger Fabric Sidechains
Hyperledger Fabric’s Channels meet many of the re-
quirements of Ethereum Private Sidechains. Adding support
for a Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus algorithm, and
encrypting the state of channels are important changes which
should be made to improve the security of the platform. In
a private conversation with John Wolpert, he suggested that
Hyperledger Fabric could benefit from supporting the use of
ERAs and Management and Pinning contracts. Using ERAs
would allow Ethereum MainNet or an Ethereum sidechain
to used as a way for entities which have not previously
interacted to set-up a network and channel together. Using
Management and Pinning contracts would allow Hyper-
ledger Fabric to leverage Ethereum MainNet’s improved
security whilst maintaining privacy.
6. Future Work
A high level overview of the Ethereum Private
Sidechains system has been provided in this paper. A more
detailed exploration and analysis of the components of
this system should be undertaken. Additionally, more work
should be undertaken in the following areas:
• Inter-sidechain communications mechanisms, with a
focus on inter-chain transactions.
• Organisationally aware consensus and voting algo-
rithms.
• Quantifiable performance requirements that match
the expectations of users of Enterprise Ethereum
Clients.
The requirements in this paper were measured against
three blockchain platforms. These requirements should be
analysed against other platforms such as R3 Corda [56].
7. Conclusion
Using the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification as
a basis, this paper has defined a set of requirements
which Enterprise Ethereum Clients that wish to offer pri-
vate sidechains capabilities should offer. None of the three
blockchain clients analysed met all of the requirements, all
having their strengths and weaknesses. Quorum supports
IBFT, a Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithms, whereas Par-
ity’s Private Transactions require all validators to approve
the transaction, and Hyperledger Fabric’s Kafka relies on
no parties acting maliciously. Parity has encrypted state
whereas Quorum and Hyperledger Fabric store state in
plaintext. Hyperledger Fabric supports channels, which are
similar to sidechain and has the concept of organisation,
whilst Quorum and Parity do not support sidechains and
don’t have the concept or organisations.
The architecture of a Ethereum Private Sidechains sys-
tem has been presented. Included in this architecture is how
this system relates to Ethereum MainNet and how to in-
corporate other sidechain like systems such as Hyperledger
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Fabric. The proposed architecture includes the Ethereum
Registration Authority system which allows for information
to securely placed onto the Ethereum blockchain such that
it is discoverable and describes a Management and Pinning
contract which pins the state of a sidechain to Ethereum
MainNet without revealing the identities of sidechain par-
ticipants and whilst protecting the transaction rate of the
sidechain.
Appendix A.
Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification Re-
quirements
A.1. Introduction
The requirements shown in this appendix are require-
ments listed in the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification
1.0. All requirements are denoted with a label. The label
starts with “EE” to indicate an Enterprise Ethereum Client
Specification based requirement. This is followed by the
section number from the specification, which is followed
by a letter to indicate the sequence number of the require-
ment within the section. The label is finished with a brief
summary of the requirement.
A.2. Application Layer
A.2.1. DApps Sublayer.
• EE-4.1a-DApp: “Apps MAY use the Enterprise
Ethereum extension to the JSON-RPC API defined
in this Specification.”
A.2.2. Smart Contract Tools Sublayer.
• EE-4.3a-Tools: “Implementations MUST provide
deployment and debugging tools for Enterprise
Ethereum smart contracts.”
• EE-4.3b-FormalVerification: “Implementations
SHOULD extend formal verification methods for
use with Enterprise Ethereum smart contracts.”
A.3. Tooling Layer
A.3.1. Permissioning and Credentials Sublayer. .
Nodes
• EE-5.1.1a-StaticStartUp: “Enterprise Ethereum im-
plementations MUST provide the ability to specify
at startup a list of static peer nodes to establish peer-
to-peer connections with.”
• EE-5.1.1b-DisableDiscovery: “Implementations
MUST provide the ability to enable or disable
peer-to-peer node discovery.”
• EE-5.1.1c-WhitelistNodes: “Implementations
MUST provide the ability to specify a whitelist of
the node identities permitted to join the network.”
• EE-5.1.1d-BlacklistNodes: “Implementations MAY
provide the ability to specify a blacklist of the node
identities not permitted to join the network.”
• EE-5.1.1e-WhitelistViaAPI: “It MUST be possible
to specify the node whitelist through an interface or
API.”
• EE-5.1.1f-BlacklistViaAPI: “It MUST be possible to
specify the node blacklist (if implemented) through
an interface or API.”
• EE-5.1.1g-CertifyNodes: “Implementations MUST
provide a way to certify the identities of nodes.”
• EE-5.1.1h-Organization: “An Enterprise Ethereum
client SHOULD provide mechanisms to define clus-
ters of nodes at the organizational level, in the
context of permissioning.”
Participants
• EE-5.1.2a-WhitelistParticipants: “Implementations
MUST provide the ability to specify a whitelist of
participant identities who are permitted to submit
transactions.”
• EE-5.1.2b-BlacklistParticipants: “Implementations
MAY provide the ability to specify a blacklist
of participant identities who are not permitted to
submit transactions.”
• EE-5.1.2c-WhitelistParticipantsViaAPI: “It MUST
be possible to specify the participant whitelist
through an interface or API.”
• EE-5.1.2d-BlacklistParticipantsViaAPI: “It MUST
be possible to specify the participant blacklist (if
implemented) through an interface or API.”
• EE-5.1.2e-CertifyParticipants: “Implementations
MUST provide a way to certify the identities of
participants.”
• EE-5.1.2f-GroupsRoles: “Implementations MUST
provide the ability to specify participant identities
in a way aligned with the usual concepts of groups
and roles.”
Additional Requirements
• EE-5.1.3a-SmartContractPermissioning:
“Implementations SHOULD provide permissioning
schemes through standard mechanisms, such as
smart contracts used in a modular way. That is,
permissioning schemes could be implemented to
interact with smart contract-based mechanisms.”
• EE-5.1.3b-RuntimeConfigUpdate: “Implementations
SHOULD provide the ability for configuration to be
updated at run time without the need to restart.”
• EE-5.1.3c-ConfigOptions: “Implementations MAY
provide configuration through the use of flat files,
command-line options, or configuration management
system interfaces.”
• EE-5.1.3d-LocalKeyManagement: “Implementations
MAY support local key management allowing users
to secure their private keys.”
• EE-5.1.3e-SecureExternalKeyGenStore: “Implemen-
tations MAY support secure interaction with an ex-
25
ternal Key Management System for key generation
and secure key storage.”
• EE-5.1.3f-HardwareSecurityModules: “Implementa-
tions MAY support secure interaction with a Hard-
ware Security Module (HSM) for deployments
where higher security levels are needed.”
A.3.2. Integration and Deployment Sublayer. .
Integration Libraries
• EE-5.2.1a-IntegrationLibraries: “Implementations
MAY provide integration libraries enabling
convenience of interaction through additional
language bindings.”
Enterprise Management Systems
• EE-5.2.2a-EntDeployment: “Implementations
SHOULD provide enterprise-ready software
deployment and configuration capabilities, including
the ability to easily: Deploy through enterprise
remote software deployment and configuration
systems; Modify configurations on already deployed
systems; Audit configurations on already deployed
systems.”
• EE-5.2.2b-EntFaultReporting: “Implementations
SHOULD provide enterprise-ready software fault
reporting capabilities, including the ability to: Log
software fault conditions; Generate events to notify
of software fault conditions; Accept diagnostic
commands from software fault management
systems.”
• EE-5.2.2c-EntPerformanceManage: “Implementa-
tions MAY provide enterprise-ready performance
management capabilities, including the ability to
easily provide relevant performance management
metrics for analysis by enterprise performance
management systems.”
• EE-5.2.2d-EntSecurity: “Implementations SHOULD
provide enterprise-ready security management inter-
action capabilities, including the ability for: Logs
to be easily monitored by enterprise security man-
agement systems; Events to be easily monitored
by enterprise security management systems; Secure
network traffic to be monitored by enterprise security
management systems.”
• EE-5.2.2e-EntHistoricalAnalysis: “Implementations
MAY provide enterprise-ready capabilities to sup-
port historical analysis, including the ability for rel-
evant metrics to be easily collected by an enterprise
data warehouse system for detailed historical analy-
sis and creating analytical reports.”
• EE-5.2.2f-EntManagementSystems: “Implementa-
tions MAY include support for other enterprise
management systems, as appropriate, such as:
Common Management Information Protocol
(CMIP), Web-Based Enterprise Management
(WBEM), Application Service Management (ASM)
instrumentation.”
A.3.3. Client Interfaces Sublayer. .
Extensions to the JSON-RPC API
• EE-5.3.1a-JsonRpcPublicEth: “Implementations
MUST provide support for the public Ethereum
JSON-RPC API.”
• EE-5.3.1b-JsonRpcTransactionAsyncExt:
“Implementations MUST provide the
eth sendTransactionAsync Enterprise Ethereum
extension call to the public Ethereum [JSON-RPC
API] for at least one of the private transaction types
defined in Section 6.1.2.”
• EE-5.3.1c-JsonRpcUnimplemented: “The
eth sendTransactionAsync call MUST respond
with an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) status code
when an unimplemented private transaction type is
requested.”
Inter-Chain
• EE-5.3.2a-InterChainInteraction: “Enterprise
Ethereum implementations MAY provide inter-
chain mediation capabilities to enable interaction
with different blockchains.”
Oracles
• EE-5.3.3a-Oracles: “Enterprise Ethereum implemen-
tations SHOULD provide the ability to securely
interact with oracles to send and receive real-world
information.”
A.4. Privacy and Scaling Layer
A.4.1. Privacy Sublayer. .
On-Chain
• EE-6.1.1a-OnChainSecurity: “Implementations
SHOULD support improved on-chain security
techniques as they become available.”
Private Transactions
• EE-6.1.2a-PrivTransMethods: “Implementations
MUST support private transactions using at least
one of the following methods: Private transactions
where payload data is transmitted to and readable
only by the direct participants of a transaction. These
transactions are referred to as restricted private
transactions; Private transactions where payload
data is transmitted to all nodes participating in the
network but readable only by the direct participants
of a transaction. These transactions are referred to
as unrestricted private transactions.”
Restricted Private Transactions
• EE-6.1.2b-RestrictedPayloadMaskingStored:
“Implementations MUST support masking or
obfuscation of the payload data when stored in
restricted private transactions (for example, using
cryptographic encryption).”
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• EE-6.1.2c-RestrictedPayloadMaskingTransit:
“Implementations MUST support masking or
obfuscation of the payload data when in transit in
restricted private transactions (for example, using
cryptographic encryption).”
• EE-6.1.2d-RestrictedMetadataMaskingStored: “Im-
plementations MAY support masking or obfuscation
of the metadata when stored in restricted private
transactions (for example, using cryptographic en-
cryption).”
• EE-6.1.2e-RestrictedMetadataMaskingTransit: “Im-
plementations MAY support masking or obfuscation
of the metadata when in transit in restricted private
transactions (for example, using cryptographic en-
cryption).”
• EE-6.1.2f-RestrictedPayloadRelayStore: “Nodes that
relay a restricted private transaction but are not
participants in that transaction MUST NOT store
transaction payload data.”
• EE-6.1.2g-RestrictedMetadataRelayStore: “Nodes
that relay a restricted private transaction but are not
participants in that transaction SHOULD NOT store
metadata.”
• EE-6.1.2h-RestrictedDefaultSecure: “The
implementation of the JSON RPC API
eth sendTransactionAsync call (if implemented),
either without the restriction parameter or with the
restriction parameter set to restricted, MUST result
in a restricted private transaction.”
Unrestricted Private Transactions
• EE-6.1.2i-UnrestrictedRecipientMasking:
“Implementations SHOULD support masking
or obfuscation of the recipient identity when stored
in unrestricted private transactions (for example,
using cryptographic encryption, or ring signatures
and mixing).”
• EE-6.1.2j-UnrestrictedSenderMasking: “Implemen-
tations SHOULD support masking or obfuscation
of the sender identity when stored in unrestricted
private transactions (for example, using stealth ad-
dresses).”
• EE-6.1.2k-UnrestrictedPayloadMaskingStored: “Im-
plementations SHOULD support masking or ob-
fuscation of the payload data when stored in un-
restricted private transactions (for example, using
cryptographic encryption).”
• EE-6.1.2l-UnrestrictedPayloadMaskingTransit: “Im-
plementations MUST support masking or obfusca-
tion of the payload data when in transit in un-
restricted private transactions (for example, using
cryptographic encryption).”
• EE-6.1.2m-UnrestrictedMetadataMaskingStored:
“Implementations MAY support masking or
obfuscation of the metadata when stored in
unrestricted private transactions (for example, using
cryptographic encryption).”
• EE-6.1.2n-UnrestrictedMetadataMaskingTransit:
“Implementations MAY support masking or
obfuscation of the metadata when in transit in
unrestricted private transactions (for example, using
cryptographic encryption).”
• EE-6.1.2o-UnrestrictedPayloadRelayStore: “Nodes
that relay an unrestricted private transaction but are
not participants in that transaction MAY store pay-
load data.”
• EE-6.1.2p-UnrestrictedMetadataRelayStore: “Nodes
that relay an unrestricted private transaction but are
not participants in that transaction MAY store trans-
action metadata.”
• EE-6.1.2q-UnrestrictedTransactions: “The
implementation of the JSON RPC API
eth sendTransactionAsync call (if implemented)
with the restriction parameter set to unrestricted
MUST result in an unrestricted private transaction.”
Private Transactions Other
• EE-6.1.2r-PrivateTransactionAddParticipants: “Im-
plementations SHOULD be able to extend the set
of participants in a private transaction (or forward
the private transaction in some way).”
• EE-6.1.2s-PrivateTransactionConsensus:
“Implementations SHOULD provide the ability
for nodes to achieve consensus on their mutually
private transactions.”
A.4.2. Scaling Sublayer. .
Off-Chain (Trusted Execution)
• EE-6.1.3a-OffchainTrustedExecution: “Enterprise
Ethereum implementations SHOULD provide
the ability for off-chain, trusted execution of
transactions and smart contracts.”
On-Chain (Layer 2)
• EE-6.2.1a-ImprovedOnchainProcessing: “Enterprise
Ethereum implementations SHOULD provide the
ability for improved on-chain processing rates of
transactions and smart contracts.”
Off-Chain (Compute)
• EE-6.2.2a-OffchainProcessing: “Enterprise
Ethereum implementations SHOULD provide
the ability for off-chain processing of transactions
and smart contracts.”
Performance
• EE-6.2.3a-ArchivePrivateState: “Implementations
SHOULD support the ability to have private state
data archived from the blockchain while preserving
the consistency and validity of the blockchain.”
• EE-6.2.3b-ComputePowerSizeParticipants: “The
computing power to validate blocks SHOULD
remain constant over time, regardless of the
blockchain size or the number of network
participants.”
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• EE-6.2.3c-RecentBlockAccessTime: “The time to
access recent blockchain data SHOULD remain con-
stant, regardless of the blockchain size.”
• EE-6.2.3d-NewGenesisBlock: “Implementations
SHOULD allow network operators to designate a
new genesis block to keep the blockchain size from
growing perpetually.”
A.5. Core Blockchain Layer
A.5.1. Storage and Ledger Sublayer.
• EE-7.1a-StoragePubEth: “Enterprise Ethereum im-
plementations SHOULD implement data storage re-
quirements necessary to operate a public Ethereum
client.”
• EE-7.1b-StorageForOptionalOffchain: “Implementa-
tions MAY implement data storage used for optional
off-chain operations.”
• EE-7.1c-SeparateStoragePerNetwork: “Implementa-
tions providing support for multiple networks (for
example, one or more consortium networks or a
public network) MUST store data related to private
transactions for those networks in private state ded-
icated to the relevant network.”
• EE-7.1d-DataAccessSameParticipants: “A smart
contract operating on private state SHOULD be
permitted to access private state created by other
smart contracts involving the same participants.”
• EE-7.1e-DataAccessDifferentParticipants: “A smart
contract operating on private state MUST NOT be
permitted to access private state created by other
smart contracts involving different participants.”
• EE-7.1f-FileDecentralizedStorage: “Implementa-
tions SHOULD provide the ability for private
smart contracts to store file objects seamlessly and
transparently, so no artificial off-chain file-storage
add-ons are needed.”
A.5.2. Execution Sublayer.
• EE-7.2a-EvmOpCodes: “Enterprise Ethereum im-
plementations MUST provide a smart contract
execution environment implementing the public
Ethereum EVM op-code set [EVM Opcodes].”
• EE-7.2b-EvmExtendedOpCodes: “Enterprise
Ethereum implementations MAY provide a smart
contract execution environment extending the public
Ethereum EVM op-code set [EVM Opcodes].”
• EE-7.2c-PublicStateSync: “Implementations
SHOULD support the ability to synchronize
their public state with the public state held by other
public Ethereum nodes.”
• EE-7.2d-PrecompiledContracts: “Implementations
MAY provide support for the compilation, storage,
and execution of precompiled contracts.”
• EE-7.2e-TEE: “TEEs ensure only authorized parties
can execute smart contracts on an execution en-
vironment related to a given consortium network.
Implementations SHOULD provide a TEE.”
• EE-7.2f-TEEConfigurableEncryption: “Multiple en-
cryption techniques could be used to secure TEEs
or private state. Implementations SHOULD provide
configurable encryption options for use in conjunc-
tion with consortium networks.”
• EE-7.2.1a-Finality: “When a deterministic consen-
sus algorithm is used, transactions SHOULD be
considered final after a defined interval or event. This
interval may be a set time period or a set number
of blocks being created since the transaction was
included in a block.”
A.5.3. Consensus Sublayer.
• EE-7.3a-MainNetConsensus: “Enterprise Ethereum
implementations SHOULD support the ability to
form consensus on Ethereum MainNet (public
Ethereum) and to form consensus operating as part
of an Enterprise Ethereum network.”
• EE-7.3b-MultipleConsensusAlgorithms:
“Implementations MUST be capable of supporting
multiple consensus algorithms.”
• EE-7.3c-PrivateConsensusAlg: “One or more con-
sensus algorithms SHOULD allow operations as part
of an Enterprise Ethereum network.”
• EE-7.3d-MainNetConsensusAlg: “One or more con-
sensus algorithms SHOULD allow operations on the
Ethereum MainNet.
• EE-7.3e-SidechainConsensusAlg: “One or more
consensus algorithms MAY support operations on
sidechain networks.”
• EE-7.3f-ConsensusAlgDocumented: “Consensus al-
gorithms MUST be clearly documented for interop-
erability.”
• EE-7.3g-ConsensusAlgModularConf: “Consensus
algorithm implementations SHOULD be modular
and configurable.”
• EE-7.3h-ConsensusInOutOfBand: “Consensus algo-
rithms MAY communicate in-band or out-of-band
with other clients, as requested. That is, consensus
algorithm implementations can make and receive
network traffic external to the client-to-client net-
work protocol.”
• EE-7.3i-ConsensusIBFT: “Implementations
SHOULD support the Istanbul [Byzantine Fault
Tolerance] (IBFT) consensus algorithm [EIP-650],
so individual attacked or malfunctioning clients
performing voting, block-making, or validation
roles do not pose a critical risk to the network.”
• EE-7.3j-ConsensusOther: “Implementations MAY
support other consensus algorithms.”
• EE-7.3k-ConsensusConfig: “Implementations
MUST provide the ability to specify the consensus
algorithms, through configuration, to be used for
each public blockchain, private blockchain and
sidechain in use.”
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A.6. Network Layer
A.6.1. Network Protocol Sublayer.
• EE-8.1a-Enode: “Nodes MUST be identified and
advertised using the Ethereum enode URL format
[enode].”
• EE-8.1b-DevP2P: “Implementations SHOULD use
the DEVp2p Wire Protocol [DEVp2p Wire Protocol]
for messaging between nodes to establish and main-
tain a communications channel for use by higher
layer protocols.”
• EE-8.1c-Eth62Eth63: “Implementations SHOULD
support, at a minimum, [Ethereum Wire Protocols]
eth/62 and eth/63.”
• EE-8.1d-NewProtocols: “Implementations MAY add
new protocols or extend existing Ethereum proto-
cols.”
• EE-8.1e-RelayNodes: “To minimize the number of
point-to-point connections needed between private
nodes, some private nodes SHOULD be capable of
relaying private transaction data to multiple other
private nodes.”
A.6.2. Anti-Spam.
• EE-9a-AntiSpam: “Enterprise Ethereum implemen-
tations SHOULD provide effective anti-spam mech-
anisms so attacking nodes or addresses (either mali-
cious, buggy, or uncontrolled) can be quickly iden-
tified and stopped.”
A.7. Cross-client Compatibility
• EE-10a-PublicEthCompatibility: “Enterprise
Ethereum clients SHOULD be compatible with
the public Ethereum network to the greatest extent
possible.”
• EE-10b-ExtendedApisSuperset: “Implementations
MAY extend the public Ethereum APIs. To maintain
compatibility, implementations SHOULD ensure
these new features are a superset of the public
Ethereum APIs.”
A.8. Synchronization and Disaster Recovery
• EE-11a-FastSync: “Implementations SHOULD sup-
port a fast synchronization mode so new clients can
be launched quickly and synchronized to long stand-
ing, historical blockchains with the understanding
that the new client might not have the complete
blockchain history.”
• EE-11b-BackupRestore: “Implementations
SHOULD support a mechanism to back up
data and use it later to initialize a node, up to a
certain block.”
Appendix B.
Glossary
Table 1 presents a list of terms used in this paper.
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Term Definition
Access Control Checks that an authenticated identity is authorised to use a resource.
Authentication Confirms the claimed identity of a party interacting with a service.
Authorisation Confers a permission to perform an action by an authenticated identity on a resource.
Chaincode The Hyperledger Fabric term for a Smart Contract.
Client The software used to operate a blockchain node.
Contract Another term for a Smart Contract.
MainNet The Ethereum public chain.
Management Chain A blockchain or sidechain which is used to coordinate the activities of a private sidechain.
Network Participant Another term for node. In particular, this is indicating the node is an entity on a peer-to-peer network taking part in the
distributed system.
Node An instance of blockchain client software operating as part of a peer-to-peer blockchain network.
Oracle. A service external to the blockchain that is trusted by the creators of smart contracts and is called to provide information.
For example, an Oracle could be a service to return a current exchange rate.
Participant A user of the API of a blockchain node. The user may be a human user or an automated computer users.
Peer The term used in Hyperledger Fabric for Node.
Permissioned A blockchain, sidechain, or smart contract which performs access control to ensure only authenticated, authorised users
can perform actions on the resource.
Permissionless A blockchain, sidechain, or smart contract which is open to all participants. That is, no access control or authentication is
performed as all participants can use the resource. Unpermissioned and non-permissioned are terms used at times in
literature to refer to permissionless resources.
Pinning Pinning, sometimes known as Pegging, is the act of posting a summary of the state of a sidechain to a management chain.
Private A blockchain, sidechain, or smart contract which is permissioned. That is, authentication, authorisation, and access control
are performed on the blockchain, sidechain, or smart contract.
Private Sidechain A permissioned blockchain which hosts private smart contracts. Ethereum Private Sidechains offer permissioning such that
only nodes which belong to organisations which are a party the sidechain have access to the sidechain transactions or state.
The Ethereum Sidechain Client APIs are permissioned such that only authorised users can interact with them, and only
authorised Ethereum Accounts can be used to submit transactions form them. The transactions and the state of sidechains
are authenticated-encrypted to ensure data confidentiality.
Public A permissionless blockchain, sidechain, or smart contract. That is, no authentication, authorisation, or access control
are performed to gain access to the blockchain, sidechain, or smart contract.
Sidechain A permissioned or permissionless blockchain which is managed via a management chain.
Smart Contract A computer program uploaded onto the blockchain.
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Requirements MUST or SHOULD or MAY Quorum Parity’s Hyperledger
MUST NOT SHOULD Private Fabric
NOT Transactions
EE-4.3a-Tools X X × X
EE-5.1.1a-StaticStartUp X X X X
EE-5.1.1b-DisableDiscovery X × N/A ×
EE-5.1.1c-WhitelistNodes X X X X
EE-5.1.1e-WhitelistViaAPI X × X X
EE-5.1.1f-BlacklistViaAPI X N/A N/A N/A
EE-5.1.1h-CertifyNodes X × × X
EE-5.1.2a-WhitelistParticipants X × × X
EE-5.1.2c-WhitelistParticipantsViaAPI X × × X
EE-5.1.2d-BlacklistParticipantsViaAPI X N/A N/A N/A
EE-5.1.2e-CertifyParticipants X × × X
EE-5.1.2f-GroupsRoles X × × X
EE-5.3.1a-JsonRpcJsonRpcPublicEth X X X Ethereum
EE-5.3.1b-JsonRpcTransactionAsyncExt X × × Ethereum
EE-5.3.1c-JsonRpcUnimplemented X × × Ethereum
EE-6.1.2a-PrivTransMethods X X X X
EE-6.1.2b-RestrictedPayloadMaskingStored X X With caveats. N/A X
See section 3.2.4
for details.
EE-6.1.2c-RestrictedPayloadMaskingTransit X X X X
EE-6.1.2f-RestrictedPayloadRelayStore X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2h-RestrictedDefaultSecure X N/A N/A Ethereum
EE-6.1.2l-UnrestrictedPayloadMaskingTransit X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2q-UnrestrictedTransactions X N/A N/A N/A
EE-7.1c-SeparateStoragePerNetwork X N/A × ×
EE-7.1e-DataAccessDifferentParticipants X × X ×
EE-7.2a-EvmOpCodes X X X Ethereum
EE-7.3b-MultipleConsensusAlgorithms X X × X
EE-7.3f-ConsensusAlgDocumented X X X X
EE-7.3k-ConsensusConfig X X × X
EE-8.1a-Enode X X X Ethereum
TABLE 2. ENTERPRISE ETHEREUM CLIENT SPECIFICATION PRIVACY LEVEL C REQUIREMENTS
Requirements MUST or SHOULD or MAY Quorum Parity’s Hyperledger
MUST NOT SHOULD Private Fabric
NOT Transactions
EE-5.1.1h-Organization X × × X
EE-5.1.3a-SmartContractPermissioning X X X X
EE-5.1.3b-RuntimeConfigUpdate X Partially Supported × X
TABLE 3. ADDITIONAL ENTERPRISE ETHEREUM CLIENT SPECIFICATION PRIVACY LEVEL B REQUIREMENTS
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Requirements MUST or SHOULD or MAY Quorum Parity’s Hyperledger
MUST NOT SHOULD Private Fabric
NOT Transactions
EE-6.1.2g-RestrictedMetadataRelayStore X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2i-UnrestrictedRecipientMasking X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2j-UnrestrictedSenderMasking X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2k-UnrestrictedPayloadMaskingStored X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2r-PrivateTransactionAddParticipants X × × X
EE-6.1.2s-PrivateTransactionConsensus X × X X
This
requirement
should be.
a MUST
TABLE 4. ADDITIONAL ENTERPRISE ETHEREUM CLIENT SPECIFICATION PRIVACY LEVEL A REQUIREMENTS
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Requirements MUST or SHOULD or MAY Quorum Parity’s Hyperledger
MUST NOT SHOULD Private Fabric
NOT Transactions
EE-4.1a-DApp X - - Ethereum
EE-4.3b- FormalVerification X X X ×
EE-5.1.1d-BlacklistNodes X - - -
EE-5.1.2b-BlacklistParticipants X - - -
EE-5.1.3c-ConfigOptions X X - X
EE-5.1.3d-LocalKeyManagement X X X X
EE-5.1.3e-SecureExternalKeyGenStore X - - X
EE-5.1.3f-HardwareSecurityModules X - - X
EE-5.2.1a-IntegrationLibraries X X X X
EE-5.2.2a-EntDeployment X X Kaleido × X
EE-5.2.2b-EntFaultReporting X X Kaleido × X
EE-5.2.2c-EntPerformanceManage X X Kaleido - X
EE-5.2.2d-EntSecurity X X Kaleido × X
EE-5.2.2e-EntHistoricalAnalysis X X Kaleido - X
EE-5.2.2f-EntManagementSystems X - - -
EE-5.3.2a-InterChainInteraction X X - -
EE-5.3.3a-Oracles X X X X
EE-6.1.1a-OnChainSecurity X X X X
EE-6.1.2d-RestrictedMetadataMaskingStored X - N/A ×
EE-6.1.2e-RestrictedMetadataMaskingTransit X - X ×
EE-6.1.2m-UnrestrictedMetadataMaskingStored X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2n-UnrestrictedMetadataMaskingTransit X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2o-UnrestrictedPayloadRelayStore X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.2p-UnrestrictedMetadataRelayStore X N/A N/A N/A
EE-6.1.3a-OffchainTrustedExecution X × × ×
EE-6.2.1a-ImprovedOnchainProcessing X X X With caveats. X
See section 3.3.3.
EE-6.2.2a-OffchainProcessing X × X X
EE-6.2.3a-ArchivePrivateState X × X X
EE-6.2.3b-ComputePowerSizeParticipants X See section 2.2.6
EE-6.2.3c-RecentBlockAccessTime X See section 2.2.6
EE-6.2.3d-NewGenesisBlock X × N/A ×
EE-7.1a-StoragePubEth X X X Ethereum
EE-7.1b-StorageForOptionalOffchain X - - -
EE-7.1d-DataAccessSameParticipants X X × X
EE-7.1f-FileDecentralizedStorage X × × X
EE-7.2b-EvmExtendedOpCodes X - - Ethereum
EE-7.2c-PublicStateSync X × X Ethereum
EE-7.2d-PrecompiledContracts X - - Ethereum
EE-7.2e-TEE X × × ×
EE-7.2f-TEEConfigurableEncryption X × × ×
EE-7.2.1a-Finality X X X X With caveats.
See section 3.4.5.
EE-7.3a-MainNetConsensus X × X Ethereum
EE-7.3c-PrivateConsensusAlg X X X X
EE-7.3d-MainNetConsensusAlg X × X Ethereum
EE-7.3e-SidechainConsensusAlg X X X X
EE-7.3g-ConsensusAlgModularConf X X × X
EE-7.3h-ConsensusInOutOfBand X X X X
EE-7.3i-ConsensusIBFT X X × ×
EE-7.3j-ConsensusOther X X X X
EE-8.1b-DevP2P X × X Ethereum
EE-8.1c-Eth62Eth63 X × X Ethereum
EE-8.1d-NewProtocols X X X Ethereum
EE-8.1e-RelayNodes X × × ×
EE-9a-AntiSpam X × Partially ×
EE-10a-PublicEthCompatibility X × X Ethereum
EE-10b-ExtendedApisSuperset X X X Ethereum
EE-11a-FastSync X X X ×
EE-11b-BackupRestore X × X ×
TABLE 5. ENTERPRISE ETHEREUM CLIENT SPECIFICATION OTHER REQUIREMENTS
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Requirements MUST or SHOULD or MAY Quorum Parity’s Hyperledger
MUST NOT SHOULD Private Fabric
NOT Transactions
BC-1a-ApiCallPermissioning X × × X
BC-1b-EthereumAccountWhitelist X × × X
BC1c-TransactionTypePermissioning X × X X
BC-1d-PrivateStateAuthenticatedEncryption X × × ×
BC-2a-OrganisationallyAwareConsensus X × × ×
BC-3a-DiscoverableBootstrapInfo X × × ×
BC-4a-ArchitecturalDecentralization X × X ×
BC-4b-PoliticalDecentralization X X X X
BC-5a-OffchainOrgToOrg X X X ×
BC-5b-OffchainAll X X X ×
BC-5c-OffchianAntiSpam X X X ×
BC-5d-Whisper X X X Ethereum
TABLE 6. ADDITIONAL ENTERPRISE ETHEREUM REQUIREMENTS
Requirements MUST or SHOULD or MAY Quorum Parity’s Hyperledger
MUST NOT SHOULD Private Fabric
NOT Transactions
SC-1a-EstablishmentNodesWhitelist X × × ×
SC-1b-EstablishmentNodesBlacklist X - - -
SC-2a-EstablishmentApiWhitelist X × × X
SC-2b-EstablishmentApiBlacklist X - - -
SC-3a-SidechainFindOrEstablishmentApi X × × X Partially
SC-3b-SidechainIdentifier X × × X
SC-4a-Pinning X X Kaleido × ×
SC-4b-PinningParticipantShielding X X Kaleido × ×
SC-4c-PinningTransactionRateShielding X × × ×
SC-4d-PinningContesting X X Kaleido × ×
SC-4e-PinningCipherTextObservers X - - -
SC-4f-PinningConfiguration X X Kaleido × ×
SC-4g-MultipleSidechains X × × ×
SC-5a-DataAccessDifferentParticipants X × × ×
SC-6a-SidechainArchive X - - -
TABLE 7. ADDITIONAL ETHEREUM PRIVATE SIDECHAIN REQUIREMENTS
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